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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
1.1.1. The increasing relevance of natural gas
Natural gas has seen a remarkable ascent: Whereas in 1965 its share in the world’s
primary energy consumption was 14 percent, by 2017 the share superseded 23 per-
cent, a trend that is expected to continue (BP, 2018, IEA, 2018b). As a consequence,
natural gas has become at least the second most important primary energy source
behind crude oil in most of the world regions, apart from Asia Pacific where coal is
the dominating primary energy source. Even in this region, natural gas demand has
boomed in recent years and is likely to continue growing in the future (IEA, 2018b).
Globally, there are varying reasons for the increasing importance of natural gas:
In North America, the shale gas revolution and resulting low gas prices are the main
driver for an increasing natural gas demand. In fact, in many regions, natural gas
is challenging coal-fired and even nuclear power generation in the electricity sector.
Hence, in North America, the increasing gas demand is mainly driven by economi-
cal and technological developments like the improvement of extraction methods for
hydraulic fracturing. In Asia the situation is different: The increase in natural gas
demand is due to political support more than economic profitability. In Japan, e.g.,
the accident at the nuclear power plant in Fukushima and the resulting temporary
nuclear phase out fueled a switch from nuclear to gas-fired power generation, mak-
ing Japan the largest global net importer of natural gas. Also in China, the largest
coal mining country in the world with plenty of coal reserves, natural gas is on the
rise. Here, the increased imports of natural gas are beginning to compete with do-
mestically mined coal to satisfy the growing energy demand, driven by the fight
against local air pollution in urban areas. Especially in the industrial sector, coal is
being replaced by natural gas to generate heat. By doing so, a large share of nitrate,
sulfides and particulates are being avoided.
Also in Europe, the importance of natural gas is increasing, despite the fact that
gas demand is expected to remain constant or increase only slightly in the next
decade. The rise in importance is given by the ambitious climate policy of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU): By 2030, 40 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions should be
reduced1. Due to the fact that natural gas is the lowest carbon-intense fossil fuel, it
is expected to help the EU to reach its climate targets in the mid-term, e.g., by sub-
stituting coal in the electricity sector. While the United Kingdom mainly phased-out
1In comparison to 1990.
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coal with the introduction of an artificial carbon price support scheme, many west-
ern European countries have initiated a politically-motivated coal phase out. Beside
the advantage of its low-carbon intensity, natural gas is also a complement to volatile
renewable energy sources (RES), as natural gas power plants can be operated with
more flexibility than other conventional power plants, e.g., coal-fired plants. Hence,
a gas-fired power station can provide backup capacity and can easily ramp up when
the wind is not blowing and the sun is not shining, i.e., when RES electricity gener-
ation falls short of covering demand. Aside from the electricity sector, natural gas
can also contribute to the decarbonization of other sectors. In the heating and the
mobility sectors, e.g., liquefied natural gas (LNG) could replace light heating oil in
rural areas, or diesel in the heavy-duty transport.
1.1.2. The increasing European import dependency on natural gas
While the European natural gas demand is expected to remain stable or slightly in-
crease, the European domestic gas production will continue to decline (IEA, 2018b).
As a consequence, the EU import demand and, hence, the import dependence for
natural gas will further increase. While today around 72 percent of the EU gas de-
mand is imported (IEA, 2018a), it is likely that this share will increase to more than
80 percent by 2030 (Hecking et al., 2016). In 2017, around 40 percent of these im-
ports where from one single supply country - the Russian Federation (IEA, 2018a).
Furthermore, more than the half of the Russian gas was supplied via one single route,
the Ukrainian pipeline transmission system. Given the relevance of natural gas for
the European energy system on the one hand and the tensions between the EU, the
Russian Federation and the Ukraine on the other2, one main goal of the EU is to
diversify its supply sources and supply routes (European Commission, 2019). As a
consequence, the EU supports the financing of infrastructure projects like LNG im-
port terminals or import pipelines as the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) to incentivize
the market entry of potential new suppliers. Furthermore, the EU supports infras-
tructure projects within Europe that promote the integration of an EU internal gas
market and hence an exchange of natural gas between the member states. As such,
this thesis analyzes the supply diversification of the EU natural gas market from an
economic perspective.
The chapters of these thesis focus on the different options for the EU to promote a
diversified gas market: Chapter 2 analyzes the effect of the Lithuanian LNG terminal
that was built to diversify the Lithuanian natural gas market and break the Russian
monopoly for natural gas supply in 2014. Subsequently, Chapter 3 investigates the
potential of the SGC project and the role of Turkey within this project. Based on that
investigation, Chapter 4 looks at the market power of transit countries and quantifies
the potential of market power that Turkey may exert within the SGC. Finally, Chapter
5 investigates the EU diversification targets in general and estimates the economic
effects of a realization up to 2025.
2The gas crisis in 2006 and 2009 as well as the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.
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1.2. Outline of the Thesis
Each chapter of this thesis is based on an article to which all authors contributed
equally:
• LNG Import Quotas in Lithuania – Economic Effects of Breaking Gazprom’s
Natural Gas Monopoly (joint work with Florian Weiser, based on Schulte and
Weiser (2019a))
• Turkey’s Role in Natural Gas – Becoming a Transit Country? (joint work with
Istemi Berk, based on Berk and Schulte (2017))
• Natural Gas Transits and Market Power – The Case of Turkey (joint work with
Florian Weiser, based on Schulte and Weiser (2019b))
• Diversification at any price? – The European Union’s diversification ambitions
for natural gas
The research objective and the main results are discussed in the next chapter.
Thereafter, the methodology and key assumptions of each chapter are introduced.
1.2. Outline of the Thesis
1.2.1. LNG Import Quotas in Lithuania - Economic Effects of Breaking
Gazprom’s Natural Gas Monopoly
Chapter 2 analyzes the economic effects of the commissioning of the Lithuanian LNG
terminal in Klaipe˙da that was financially supported by EU institutions. Together with
the agreement of the LNG terminal was the decision of a yearly minimum LNG import
level via a long-term contract (LTC). As a consequence of the project, Gazprom’s gas
monopoly in Lithuania was broken. Although the LNG of the LTC was competitively
priced with an hub indexation, it had higher marginal supply costs than Russian
gas. The chapter assesses the potential of such a minimum import level to mitigate
the market power of a monopolistic supplier. A market consisting of a dominant
supplier with low marginal supply costs and a competitive fringe with high marginal
supply costs is analyzed. It is shown that there is a minimum import level for fringe
supplies that optimizes the consumer surplus, which is adjusted by a compensation
paid for the fringe’s market entry. The developed model is parameterized for the
Lithuanian gas market in 2014. It becomes clear that the decision to incentivize the
market entry of high-cost LNG and thus diversify the Lithuanian gas market could
be rationalized and was a feasible way to address Gazprom’s market power.
1.2.2. Turkey’s Role in Natural Gas – Becoming a Transit Country?
Besides supporting LNG import infrastructure that allows flexible imports from vari-
ous exporters, the EU is also supporting new pipeline corridors to permanently con-
nected suppliers to diversify its natural gas market. Chapter 3 analyzes the role of
3
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Turkey in the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) that consists of planned pipeline projects
connecting the natural gas producers in the Caspian region and the Middle East with
the European natural gas markets. The project is one of the EU’s priority projects
to diversify the European natural gas supply sources and routes. The pipelines to
distribute the gas within the EU, but also the pipelines to bring the gas to the EU,
are financially supported by EU institutions. In this chapter, Turkey’s role within the
project is analyzed by the simulation of different quantitative scenarios. To analyze
Turkey’s potential role as a transit country within this corridor, the transit volumes
via Turkey to the European gas markets are quantified up to 2030. The results imply
that under current conditions, i.e., a competitive environment of upstream suppli-
ers in European gas markets leading to lower prices, Turkey’s role would be of only
minor importance. In accordance with various scenarios presented in this chapter,
Turkey’s role is seen to be most important if European future demand is more than
projected and if the movement of European gas markets towards a competitive up-
stream environment fails.
1.2.3. Natural Gas Transits and Market Power - The Case of Turkey
Based on Chapter 3, Chapter 4 investigates Turkey’s role in the SGC from another
perspective. Turkey has a key role in realizing the SGC due to its geographical lo-
cation. In this chapter, it is investigated to what extend Turkey may benefit from
this role. The perception of BOTAS¸, the Turkish national oil and gas company, is to
buy gas arriving at the Eastern borders of Turkey and sell it at a profit to European
customers instead of taking a pure transit role (Skalamera, 2016). Hence, in eco-
nomic terms, BOTAS¸ wants to exercise market power with its gas transits (transit
market power). In Chapter 4, the potential of Turkish transit market power as well
as the implications for the European gas markets af investigated. In doing so, the
global partial equilibrium gas market model COLUMBUS is applied. An oligopolistic
and a competitive supply structure in the European upstream market in 2030 are
considered in the model based on calibrations to historical gas market situations. If
the European gas market in 2030 is characterized by an oligopolistic supply, Turkey
is able to exert market power resulting in higher prices compared to competitive
transits, in particular in South Eastern Europe. In a competitive market structure,
however, due to its high supply costs the importance of the Southern Gas Corri-
dor and thus the potential of Turkish transit market power is limited. As a policy
implication, the EU could harmonize Turkey’s energy laws with EU directives that
guarantee a non-discriminative access to transmission grids as well as policies incen-
tivizing contractual relations between the Southern Gas Corridor producers, Turkey
and European importers. Alternatively, the EU should minimize dependencies on
transit countries in general.
4
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1.2.4. Diversification at any price? – The European Union’s
diversification ambitions for natural gas
While the previous chapters look at specific options or infrastructure projects to di-
versify the EU natural gas market, the last chapter analyzes the EU diversification
ambitions in general. These are set and monitored by the Agency for Cooperation
of Energy Regulators (ACER), which evaluates the level of diversification for natu-
ral gas of each EU member state. In order to do so, ACER defines several specific
metrics and respective scores the metrics should fulfill. The first part will look at
ACER’s diversification metric, the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI). To this end,
ACER’s definition of the HHI as well as its application is questioned. In the second
part, a realization of ACER’s predefined HHI score is simulated for the year 2025.
Once again the natural gas market model COLUMBUS is extended and applied. The
results show that the fulfillment of the scores would have strong implications on gas
flows as well as economics. On the one hand, it would replace natural gas flows
from eastern Europe, e.g., the Russian Federation, to the western Europe, e.g., LNG
imports. Hence, Russia would have to reduce its natural gas supply by around one
third in 2025. On the other hand, due to the ban of the low-cost Russian gas, the di-
versification would result in higher European natural gas prices and hence a welfare
loss of 13.6 billion Euro.
1.3. Methodology
Within this thesis, different research questions regarding the supply diversification
of the EU natural gas market are answered by the application of fundamental gas
market models. While the investigations in Chapter 2 are based on an analytical
model, the analyzes in Chapter 3 to Chapter 5 are based on numerical simulation
models. However, to classify the model results into reality, it is indispensable to
discuss the underlying methodologies and assumptions.
The analysis in Chapter 2 is based on a sequential model with two stages. In a first
stage a country decides about a welfare maximizing import from a high cost com-
petitive fringe that sells its output at marginal costs. In the second stage a dominant
player with low costs decides about its supply to the country. The analysis is only
valid for a homogeneous good like natural gas. The demand of the country is given
by an inverse demand function. When the model is applied to the Lithuanian gas
market linear functions for supply and demand are assumed. For the Lithuanian mar-
ket it is shown that there is an economic rationale to import a certain amount from
a high cost competitive fringe to effect the behavior of a dominant player. Further-
more, it is shown that the findings hold also true for more sophisticated functional
demand functions as long as the functions would not be too concave and the delta
between the costs of the competitive fringe and the dominant supplier would not be
too high.
5
1. Introduction
The analysis in the remaining Chapters 3 to 5 are based on the global gas mar-
ket model COLUMBUS. COLUMBUS is an equilibrium model that is formulated as
a mixed complementary problem (MCP) and allows the simulation of strategic be-
havior on the supply side. The demand side is modeled with price-elastic linear
functions for the inverse demand. The model is calibrated using historic data and
allows the simulation of the future development of the natural gas market. However,
due to the uncertainty about the future, different possible scenarios are simulated in
each Chapter of this thesis. Chapter 3 investigates if Turkey will become an impor-
tant transit country for the EU. In general, the analysis is based on a pure economic
rationale. However, due to the fact that Turkey’s role as a transit country depends on
different possible economic and political factors such as the future EU gas demand
or supply developments, the realization of competing infrastructure projects or the
connection of other potential suppliers to the SGC, several scenarios are considered.
Additionally, it is assumed that Turkey as a transit country would be not able exert
market power.
While in Chapter 3 Turkey itself behaved as a competitive transit country, Chapter
4 goes one step further and models Turkey as a country that potentially exerts mar-
ket power with its transits against the EU by withholding gas volumes. Hereto the
COLUMBUS models is extended. However, due to the resulting complexity of the
model, the EU gas market is aggregated into two market areas, a north-western and
a south-eastern market. A comparison of the results with Chapter 3 shows that the
impact of this simplification is only minor. To cover the uncertainty about the future
development of the EU supply structure, an oligopolistic and a competitive upstream
sector is simulated. Again, the chapter is based on a pure economic rational. Political
constraints and options are analyzed in additional scenarios.
Chapter 5 is analyzing the EU diversification ambitions by implementing ACER’s
HHI metric score into the COLUMBUS model. Focusing on 2025, one scenario with
and one scenario without an achievement of the score is simulated. However, the
HHI metric score is not implemented directly. Instead, a maximum import level for a
single supplier of an EU member state is implemented. The HHI is calculated ex-post
in an iterative process. However, due to the fact that is only one main supplier that
is causing the height of the HHI, the implementation of a maximum supply share is
adequate. The same is true for the assumption that in COLUMBUS, countries and
not companies are modeled due to the fact that the main supply countries can be
associated with one major export company, e.g., Russia with Gazprom or Algeria
with Sonatrach.
The discussion of the methodology within this section solely provides a general
overview. Within each chapter, the respective methodology is discussed in more
detail. Furthermore, a detailed description of the COLUMBUS model is provided by
Hecking and Panke (2012) as well as in the Appendix.
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2. LNG Import Quotas in Lithuania - Economic
Effects of Breaking Gazproms‘s Natural Gas
Monopoly
Until 2014, Russia’s Gazprom had a natural gas monopoly in Lithuania. In order
to break the Russian monopoly, the Lithuanian state financed an import terminal
for liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Klaipe˙da. In addition to building the terminal,
Lithuania signed a long-term contract (LTC) which can be interpreted as a minimum
import volume quota for LNG having higher marginal supply costs than Russian
gas. This chapter assesses the potential of such a minimum import volume quota
to mitigate the market power of a monopolistic supplier. A market consisting of a
dominant supplier with low marginal supply costs and a competitive fringe with high
marginal supply costs is analyzed. It is shown that there is a minimum import volume
quota for fringe supplies that optimizes the consumer surplus, which is adjusted by a
compensation paid for the fringe’s market entry. Therefore, the Lithuanian decision
to incentivize the market entry of high-cost LNG can be rationalized.
2.1. Introduction
In recent years, natural gas prices in Eastern Europe have been significantly higher
than in Central or Western Europe (ACER, 2016), primarily due to the dominant po-
sition of Russia’s gas exporter Gazprom in the Eastern European gas markets (Hen-
derson and Mitrova, 2015). As of 2013, several European Union (EU) member
states were subject to a Russian gas supply monopoly: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia
and Finland (ACER, 2014). Apart from the economic disadvantages resulting from
Gazprom’s monopoly, political actors in those countries feared that Russian gas de-
liveries could be used as a political tool by the Russian administration. Against this
background, Lithuania, built an import terminal for liquefied natural gas (LNG) in
Klaipe˙da in 2014 with financial support from the EU to allow LNG suppliers access
to their market, thus breaking Gazprom’s monopoly (Pakalkaité, 2016).
Although the political goal of supply diversification was achieved by this measure,
an economic assessment of the terminal crucially depends on global LNG market
developments.1 Lithuania secured a long-term contract (LTC) with the Norwegian
supplier Statoil in 2014 to provide must-run LNG imports ensuring the continuous
utilization of the newly built terminal. The marginal supply costs of Gazprom were
1LNG is a global commodity as analyzed by e.g. Barnes and Bosworth (2015).
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generally considered to be much lower than those of LNG, which has to be lique-
fied, transported by ship and regasified at the destination. In addition, there was
a global scarcity of liquefaction plants in the mid 2010s, which led to a high uti-
lization of existing plants and an increase in LNG prices compared to previous years
(International Gas Union, 2015).
The objective of this chapter, therefore, is to investigate the economic rationale be-
hind the Lithuanian policy to incentivize must-run imports of high-cost LNG. Such
incentives may not be necessary in the case of comparably low LNG prices, i.e. LNG
would be imported without a minimum import requirement if an LNG import termi-
nal has been constructed. However, the LTC leads to economic disadvantages for the
owner of the LNG terminal if LNG import prices are higher than the gas price paid
to the dominant supplier. If the owner of the LNG terminal is the state, as is the case
in Lithuania, the potential losses generated by the LNG imports are then passed on
to the citizens or gas customers in one way or another. Hence, one would intuitively
think that securing a LTC for LNG may induce additional burdens for gas customers
in situations with comparably high LNG import prices. However, the chapter at hand
argues that a minimum import requirement for LNG could enhance Lithuanian na-
tional welfare2 even if the LNG import prices would be above the former Russian
monopoly price. This is due to the reaction of the dominant supplier on the market
intervention. Hence, the Lithuanian decision to build the terminal and sign a LTC
can be rationalized as a feasible instrument to address Gazprom’s market power.
Generally speaking, our analysis investigates a market consisting of a dominant
supplier with low marginal supply costs and a competitive fringe with high marginal
supply costs. In this setting, a minimum volume quota3 for the fringe supply is
considered. It is shown that a minimum volume quota can increase the consumer
surplus of an importing country adjusted by the compensation payments necessary
to introduce the quota.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 2.2 gives an overview of the liter-
ature relevant for this analysis. Section 2.3 focuses on a stylized model in which the
implications of a minimum volume quota are discussed analytically. In Section 2.4,
the model is applied with parameters characterizing the Lithuanian gas market in
2014. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2. Literature Review
There are two aspects of our research that, to the best of our knowledge, have yet
to be investigated in the literature. First, a minimum import volume quota for a
high-cost fringe as a trade policy instrument to increase the consumer surplus of a
2Due to the fact that Lithuania does not have indigenous natural gas resources and thus no production,
national welfare is identical to the consumer surplus.
3A volume quota means that a fixed amount of fringe volume needs to be imported in the market. A
share quota, however, would mean that a certain share of the demand needs to be supplied by the
fringe.
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national market is a novelty. Second, the application of this policy instrument to the
Lithuanian natural gas market is new. We have identified three different branches
of literature that are relevant for our investigation: 1) literature on (strategic) trade
theory, 2) industrial organization literature focusing on fringe-firm intervention and
multiple sourcing, and 3) literature on the Lithuanian natural gas market.
Strategic trade theory (also referred to as "strategic trade policy") investigates
policy instruments affecting the output of a dominant foreign firm. Within the lit-
erature, there exist several studies analyzing the effects of tariffs and quotas for the
national welfare of a country. The first seminal work to examine the equivalence of
different trade restrictions was Bhagwati (1965). He shows equivalence of tariffs
and quotas for a market configuration with a dominant foreign firm and a domestic
producer that is assumed to be competitive. Based on his findings, but relaxing the
assumption of a competitive domestic producer, Shibata (1968), Yadav (1968) and
Bhagwati (1968) show non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas because the domestic
producer benefits from monopoly power under a quota. Furthermore, Hwang and
Mai (1988) illustrate that the equivalence of tariffs and quotas also depends on the
market behavior of the firms analyzed. By using a conjectural variation approach
with different conjectures, they expose that equivalence holds only for the Cournot
case. Other works investigate quotas and tariffs separately. Brander and Spencer
(1981), for instance, analyze tariff policies in an imperfectly competitive market.
They show how a tariff can be used to extract rents from a foreign exporter. More-
over, their results illustrate the benefits regarding the national welfare of using a
tariff to support the market entry of a domestic firm. Eaton and Grossman (1986)
focus on Bertrand competition rather than Cournot competition analyzing the wel-
fare effects of trade policy under oligopoly. They find that a tax optimizes national
welfare with Bertrand competition. Breton and Zaccour (2001) focus on import
quotas in an abstraction of European gas markets in the 1980s. They consider an
asymmetric oligopoly with a diversification constraint on a player representing the
Soviet Union. Krishna (1989) studies the effect of an import quota in a duopoly of
a home firm and a foreign firm. He examines the increasing profitability of a home
firm that is able to raise its prices when imports are restricted. He shows that the
home consumers are the losers of the maximum import quota.
The aforementioned literature analyzes instruments having a direct effect on the
dominant supplier. A minimum quota in this chapter supports the market entry of
the high-cost supplier and has thereby only an indirect effect on the output of the
dominant firm. A similar effect is examined by Brander and Spencer (1985): Based
on a two stage game, they show that export subsidies may be an attractive trade pol-
icy instrument from a domestic point of view. While governments set subsidies in a
first stage, firms set their output levels based on the subsidy and on the rivals’ out-
put in a second stage. The results of Brander and Spencer (1985) illustrate that the
export subsidy lowers a good’s world price and increases the domestic firm’s profit
by extracting rents from the foreign firm. Whereas the subsidy analyzed in the work
of Brander and Spencer (1985) supports the domestic producer, the chapter at hand
considers a minimum import quota to incentivize the entry of an external high-cost
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competitive supplier. A recent application of strategic trade theory to gas markets in
a cooperative game theory framework is Ikonnikova and Zwart (2014). Similar to
our analysis, they focus on a setting in which both buyers and sellers have market
power. They find that trade restrictions like quotas can increase buyers’ countervail-
ing market power. However, their focus is on strategic externalities among several
buyers, whereas this chapter concentrates on a single pair of buyer and dominant
seller in a non-cooperative game theory framework.
A further stream of literature that is relevant for this analysis can be clustered
under the concepts of multiple sourcing and fringe-firm intervention as part of the
literature on partial industry regulation. According to Ayres and Braithwaite (1992),
fringe-firm intervention means that a regulator or private company supports the en-
try of a competitive fringe into a market with a dominant player. In line with Stigler
(1964) and Tirole (1988), an increasing number of competitors in a market results
in increasing competition. Hence, competition is induced without a direct regula-
tory restrain to the dominant firm. Examples for markets in which fringe-firm in-
tervention takes place are the defense or the automotive industry, e.g. Riordan and
Sappington (1989), Farrell and Gallini (1988), Anton and Yao (1987) and Demski
et al. (1987). However, literature on fringe-firm interventions of private companies
is limited because private companies are faced with a free-rider problem: If one
company decides to support the market entry of a competitive fringe, and the fringe
produces an input for the company, also the company’s competitors would benefit.
Moreover, the examples provided in the literature focus on complex and differenti-
ated goods as defense systems. In our work we analyze the market for natural gas,
which is a homogeneous good. An import quota as investigated in the following, is
only applicable to a homogeneous good.
There are only a few contributions in the literature on resource markets address-
ing the Lithuanian energy market. Works that include the Baltic gas markets in
analyzing the European gas security of supply are e.g. Richter and Holz (2015) and
Baltensperger et al. (2017). Hinchey (2018) discusses Russian natural gas pricing
in Europe in the presence of alternative supply options for gas. In doing so, a special
focus is put on the Lithuanian LNG terminal. Similar to our chapter, Hinchey (2018)
finds that importing LNG was economically rational for Lithuania. However, her fo-
cus is rather on a bargaining solution than on a non-cooperative game. In addition,
compared to the analysis of Hinchey (2018) who only examines prices, this chapter
evaluates the welfare impacts of LNG imports for the Lithuanian gas market.
2.3. Theoretical Model
Before the Lithuanian natural gas market is analyzed in more detail, the effect of a
minimum import quota on a market for a homogenous good is analyzed within a
theoretical framework. First, general functional forms of the cost and supply func-
tions in the model are considered. Later on, linear simplifications for those functions
are used.
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2.3.1. General Model Setup
A country demands a homogeneous good q from abroad. The demand is given by
q (p), and p (q) is the inverse demand function. The law of demand is assumed to
hold.
There are two sources for the good: (i) a dominant supplier D and (ii) a com-
petitive fringe F . The cost functions of both supply sources CD (q) and CF (q) are
convex. The dominant supplier is more cost efficient than the competitive fringe,
i.e. has lower marginal supply costs: C ′D (q) < C ′F (q) . The importing country con-
siders introducing a quota L for imports from the competitive fringe. The question
is whether a quota increases national welfare, and how it is optimally chosen. We
analyze this in a two stage interaction model. In the first stage, L is determined by
the country with the objective to maximize national welfare, which is equivalent to
the consumer surplus in the absence of indigenous production. Afterwards, there is
supply by the dominant supplier and the fringe firms.4
Fringe firms sell their output at the marginal cost C
′
F =
∂ CF (L)
∂ L to meet the quota,
i.e. their output equals exactly the quota L. Thus, the country’s expenditures for the
import from the fringe firms will be L ·C ′F (L) . The dominant supplier takes the quota
as given and maximizes profit with respect to the residual demand qR (p) = q (p)−L.
Graphically, the residual demand is a parallel shift of the demand function. The
dominant supplier chooses a quantity q∗D:
q∗D ∈ argmaxqD p (qD + L) · qD − CD (qD) . (2.1)
The optimal q∗D is a function of L. The country chooses L∗ to maximize national
consumer surplus adjusted by a compensation paid to the fringe firms (from now on
called "adjusted consumer surplus"):
L∗ ∈ argmax
L
CS (L) , (2.2)
where CS (L) =
∫ q∗D+L
0
p (x) d x − p  q∗Dq∗D − LC ′F (L) . (2.3)
Assuming an interior solution, the optimal national quota is given with C
′′
F =
∂ 2CF (L)
∂ L2 by:
4Similar to the game in the seminal analysis of Brander and Spencer (1985), the country’s action takes
place before the firm’s actions. Brander and Spencer (1985) mention that the market intervention
announced by the government is assumed to be credible as the reason why the country is able to
move first.
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∂ CS
∂ L
=

1+
∂ q∗D
∂ L

p
 
q∗D + L
− ∂ q∗D
∂ L

∂ p
∂ qD

qD=q∗D
· q∗D + p
 
q∗D
− C ′′F L − C ′F=0.
(2.4)
This can be reformulated as follows:
p
 
q∗D + L
− C ′F − C ′′F L = −∂ q∗D∂ L p  q∗D + L+ ∂ q∗D∂ L

p
 
q∗D

+
∂ p
∂ qD

qD=q∗D
· q∗D

. (2.5)
On the left hand side of equation (2.5), there is the change in consumer surplus
due to receiving one (marginal) unit more from the fringe firms when (marginally)
increasing the quota: The first term represents the additional consumer surplus, the
second term the cost for the additional unit, and the third term the change in cost for
all inframarginal units bought from the fringe. On the right hand side, there is the
change from the reaction of the dominant supplier. If the supply of the dominant
supplier decreases (∂ q∗D/∂ L < 0), the consumer surplus is reduced (first term).
However, less supply from the incumbent saves the cost for this reduced supply (first
part of the expression in brackets in the second term) but also drives up the price
for all inframarginal units (second part of the expression in brackets in the second
term).
A strictly positive quota L > 0 is optimal, if the following condition holds:
∂ CS
∂ L

L=0
=

1+
∂ q∗D
∂ L

p
 
q∗D
− C ′F (0)− ∂ q∗D∂ L

∂ p
∂ qD

qD=q∗D
· q∗D + p
 
q∗D

> 0.
(2.6)
Proposition 2.1. A strictly positive quota, L > 0, increases the importing country’s
adjusted consumer surplus if (a) the fringe firms’ marginal costs are not too high, i.e.
C
′
F (0) <

1+
∂ q∗D
∂ L

p
 
q∗D
 − ∂ q∗D∂ L  ∂ p∂ qD 
qD=q∗D
· q∗D + p
 
q∗D

, and (b) the inverse de-
mand function is not too convex, i.e. C
′′−p′
q∗D
> p′′.
Proof. The first order conditions of the dominant supplier’s problem are given by:
∂ p
∂ qD
qD + p (qD + L)− ∂ CD
∂ qD
= 0. (2.7)
Thus, for an interior solution q∗D satisfying this condition, the implicit function the-
orem implies
∂ qD
∂ L

qD=q∗D
=
−p′
p′′q∗D + 2p′ − C ′′D
. (2.8)
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The numerator of the right hand side of equation (2.8) is positive because p′ is
negative due to the law of demand. The denominator, however, is negative because
of the second order conditions of the dominant supplier’s problem. Hence, the total
expression on the right hand side of equation (2.8) is negative. The right hand of
equation (2.8) is larger than −1 if and only if C ′′−p′ > p′′q∗D, which holds as long as
p′′ is not too large, i.e. if the inverse demand function is not too convex. In that case,
0 >
∂ q∗D
∂ L > −1 holds. This means that the first and the third term of equation (2.6)
are strictly positive (note that the dominant supplier’s optimization implies that the
expression in brackets in the third term is weakly larger than the (positive) dominant
supplier’s marginal costs). In that case, the left hand side of equation (2.6) is positive
if C
′
F (0) is not too large.
The requirement that the fringe’s marginal costs should not be too high intuitively
makes sense. Importing fringe volume by the quota is more expensive, the higher
the marginal costs of the fringe. The condition about the convexity of the inverse
demand function, however, is more difficult to interpret intuitively because there
are two opposing effects: 1) A very convex inverse demand function implies that
a parallel leftward shift of the inverse demand will ceteris paribus lead to higher
outputs by the dominant supplier (for any qD, the slope of the inverse demand is
flatter, and placing additional units in the market requires a smaller decrease of
price). This leads to a decrease in price. 2) However, the additional consumer
surplus due to the decrease in price is small if the inverse demand is very convex.
Then, a situation can occur in which the compensation paid to the fringe exceeds
the additional consumer surplus leading to a negative total effect.
Besides the impact of the quota on the importing country’s adjusted consumer
surplus, the total welfare (including the producer surplus of the dominant supplier
and the fringe firms) is of interest. The welfare is defined as:
W (L) =
∫ q∗D+L
0
p (x) d x − CD
 
q∗D
− CF (L) . (2.9)
As shown in A.1, the welfare does not increase if a positive volume quota is intro-
duced.
2.3.2. Optimal Quota for Linear Inverse Demand and Cost Functions
As a simplification, we now assume a linear inverse demand function:
P(qD + L) = α− β · (qD + L). (2.10)
Additionally, linear cost functions for the dominant supplier D and the fringe F are
assumed:
Ci(qi) = ai + C
′
i · qi for i = D, F. (2.11)
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Plugging this into equation (2.5), we get:
L∗ = − 1
β
· C ′F + αβ + q
∗
D ·
∂ q∗D
∂ L
. (2.12)
Equation (2.8) becomes for the linear simplification:
∂ q∗D
∂ L = −12 . Then, the follow-
ing solution is obtained:
L∗ = − 1
β
· C ′F + αβ − q
∗
D · 12. (2.13)
q∗D =
C ′F − C ′D
3
2β
. (2.14)
qwoD
C
′
D
p1
C
′
F
q
p
L qwoD L+ qwD
C
′
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′
F
p1
p2
q
p
Compensation
Additional CS
Figure 2.1.: Market without a quota (left hand side) and with a quota (right hand side)
Figure 2.1 illustrates the effect of the minimum import quota schematically for lin-
ear inverse demand and cost functions. On the left hand side, the situation without
a quota is shown. No fringe volumes enter the market due to the fringe’s high con-
stant marginal supply costs. On the right hand side, the quota has been introduced.
It can be seen that the volumes supplied by the dominant supplier are reduced by
the introduction of the quota. However, because the dominant supplier has market
power, the reduction of her volume, L2 , is lower than the quota volume, L. Hence,
the total supplied volumes increase by the introduction of the quota leading to a
decrease in price and to additional consumer surplus. However, since the marginal
supply costs of the fringe exceed the resulting market price, the fringe firms must
be compensated for the difference between the market price and marginal supply
costs. Although the additional consumer surplus is reduced by this compensation,
there is still a positive effect on the consumer surplus.
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After it was shown in general that it is possible to design volume quotas optimizing
the consumer surplus adjusted by payments to the fringe firms, the introduced model
is applied to the case of the Lithuanian gas market in the next section.
2.4. Application to the Lithuanian Natural Gas Market
As outlined in the introduction, the Lithuanian gas market changed in 2014 from
a monopoly structure to a market structure with a dominant supplier having low
marginal supply costs and a competitive fringe having high marginal supply costs.
In addition, Lithuania signed a LTC for LNG, which can be interpreted as a minimum
volume quota for LNG allowing us to apply the theoretical considerations developed
in Section 2.3 to the Lithuanian gas market.
2.4.1. Background
In absence of natural gas resources, Lithuania is 100% dependent on imports. Be-
cause the country was a former part of the Soviet Union, its only import pipeline
is connected to Russia. Prior to December 2014, when the LNG import terminal
in Klaipe˙da started operation, Gazprom had a monopoly for gas sales to Lithuania,
which resulted in comparably high gas prices (ACER, 2015a). In the fourth quar-
ter of 2014, the Lithuanian gas price was 408 €/1000m3, whereas the gas price at
the Dutch hub Title Transfer Facility (TTF), the most liquid European gas hub, was
247 €/1000m3 (European Commission, 2014).
In addition to building the LNG terminal, Lithuania signed a LTC with Norway’s
Statoil with an annual contracted quantity (ACQ) of 0.55 bcm and a take-or-pay
(TOP) volume of 0.44 bcm of LNG.5 The LNG price was based on the natural gas price
of the National Balancing Point (NBP), the natural gas hub of the United Kingdom,
with a surcharge (Pakalkaité, 2016).
Historically, the purpose of LTCs in the gas industry was to mitigate price and
volume risks and ensure the usage of certain infrastructure elements, e.g. pipelines
and LNG terminals. In the Lithuanian case, this may have been a motivation behind
signing the LTC, too. However, it is clear that the LTC would be a bad decision from
the point of view of a profit optimizing terminal owner if the marginal supply costs
of LNG would be above the gas price in the Lithuanian gas market (the price having
to be paid to Gazprom). Because the marginal supply costs of LNG are higher than
the marginal supply costs of Russian gas, there is indeed the risk of such unfavorable
market conditions for the LNG terminal. Therefore, it is unlikely that private actors
would have financed a LNG terminal in Lithuania. Indeed, no actor other than the
Lithuanian state took the risk of the investment. The costs of the investments were
passed on to the gas customers by supplements on gas (Pakalkaité, 2016). However,
5It is assumed that the TOP volume is 80 percent of the ACQ. This is a typical annual flexibility for
LTCs (Franza, 2014).
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even in the absence of a private business case for the terminal, the enhancing effects
of minimum import quotas for the consumer surplus discussed in Section 2.3 indicate
that the decision of the Lithuanian state to build the terminal and sign a LTC can be
rationalized from a domestic point of view.
The assumptions of the model framework described in Section 2.3 fit well for the
Lithuanian gas market. Due to the coupling of the LTC prices to the NBP, the LNG
imports can be assumed to be competitively priced, even though the LTC was secured
with only one company. As in the theoretical model, capacity constraints of the gas
infrastructure are not relevant for Lithuania. The pipeline connection from Russia
allows imports of more than 10 bcm/a and the LNG terminal has a regasification
capacity of 4 bcm/a (Gas Infrastructure Europe, 2017), whereas the Lithuanian gas
demand was only 2.54 bcm in 2014 (IEA, 2016).6
2.4.2. Initial Monopoly Situation
In this subsection the monopoly situation before the construction of the LNG terminal
is considered. The analysis is based on linear functions for the inverse demand and
supply costs.7
In line with Bros (2012), marginal costs for Russian gas of 0.07 €/m3 are as-
sumed.8 We introduce a reference price Pre f , a reference demand Dre f and a point
measure for the price elasticity of demand ε. The parameters of the inverse demand
function α and β can be related to those parameters:
β = −Pre f /Dre f /ε, (2.15)
α= Pre f + β · Dre f . (2.16)
Due to the fact that the Lithuanian LNG terminal was commissioned in December
of 2014, it is assumed that the average price and demand situation in 2014 still
corresponded to a monopoly situation. With the historic demand of 2.54 bcm and the
price of 394 €/1000m3 that is the weighted average price of Russian gas deliveries
6Even if the interconnection point between Lithuania and Latvia in Kieme˙nai having a capacity of
2 bcm/a would be fully used to reexport gas from Lithuania, Russian import pipeline capacities
would still be sufficient to cover the Lithuanian demand and the reexports to Latvia.
7In order to quantify the effects of a minimum import quota, certain functional forms for the demand
and supply curves have to be considered. Linear functions are a straightforward approach, since
any function can be approximated by a linear function in a small range around a certain point.
However, as shown in the previous section, more sophisticated functional forms would not change
the key result there is a rationale behind incentivizing the LNG imports to Lithuania as long as the
demand function would not be too concave and the marginal costs of the LNG suppliers would not
be too high.
8This includes the Russian gas production costs, mineral extraction tax and transportation costs in
Russia. However, the Russian export duty is not included as a cost component because it is consid-
ered to be part of the Russian producer surplus from exporting gas.
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Table 2.1.: Characteristics of the Lithuanian gas market in 2014
Parameter Value Unit
C
′
D 70 €/1000m3
Pre f 394 €/1000m3
Dre f 2.54 bcm
ε -1.22 -
CS 411 million €
Φ 822 million €
to Lithuania in 2014 (European Commission, 2016) the point elasticity is chosen so
that the monopoly quantity matches the reference demand. Then, the monopoly
price also corresponds to the reference price by construction. This value of the point
elasticity is given by:
ε=
Pre f
C ′D − Pre f
. (2.17)
With the parameters discussed above, this results in a point elasticity of -1.22.9
As can be seen in Table 2.1, this parameterization leads to a Russian profit Φ of
822 million Euro while the Lithuanian consumer surplus CS is 411 million Euro. Af-
ter discussing the monopoly situation, the impact of LNG imports on the Lithuanian
market will be analyzed in the next section.
2.4.3. The Effects of a minimum LNG Import Quota
Based on the inverse demand function of 2014, the Lithuanian decision to sign the
LTC for 0.44 bcm/a of LNG is now evaluated. Because the marginal supply costs C
′
F
of LNG were uncertain when the LTC was signed, market implications of LNG imports
are discussed in dependence on the costs C
′
F .
9This is close to -1.25, which is the empirically determined value for the long-run price elasticity
of natural gas demand according to Burke and Yang (2016). As also mentioned by Burke and
Yang (2016), the literature reports small (inelastic) values for the price elasticity in the short-run.
Especially for households, the demand is usually assumed to be very inelastic in the short-run due
to the requirement to heat in the cold period of the year. Since a monopolist chooses a point on
the elastic segment of the demand function according to basic economic theory, it seems plausible
that his pricing behavior is rather determined by the long-run price elasticity of demand.
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The left hand side of Figure 2.2 illustrates the Lithuanian LNG import volumes
when the costs C
′
F are varied. The figure shows three different setups: (1) im-
ports without a quota (solid graph), (2) imports with the quota of 0.44 bcm/a as
introduced by the Lithuanian government (dashed graph), and (3) imports with an
optimal quota maximizing the adjusted consumer surplus as described in Section
2.3 (dashed-dotted graph). Without a quota, LNG enters the market at costs C
′
F
lower than the monopoly price of 394 €/1000m3, whereas no LNG imports would
take place if the costs C
′
F would be above the monopoly price. However, with the
Lithuanian quota, at least 0.44 bcm of LNG would be imported irrespective of the
costs C
′
F . With the optimal quota, more LNG compared to the two other illustrated
cases would be imported. For instance, the optimal minimum import quota would
be approximately 1.7 bcm at the monopoly price.
The right hand side of Figure 2.2 shows the development of Russian gas imports
in dependence on the marginal supply costs for LNG for the case without a quota,
with the Lithuanian quota and an optimal quota. Obviously, a binding import quota
for LNG lowers the gas imports from Russia compared to the case without a quota.
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Figure 2.2.: LNG imports (left hand side) and Russian gas imports (right hand side) in de-
pendence on C
′
F
After discussing the implications of a minimum quota on import volumes, the ef-
fects on gas prices are analyzed in a next step. Hereto, Figure 2.3 shows the Lithua-
nian gas price in dependence on the LNG costs C
′
F . As long as the import requirement
is over-fulfilled, the prices without a quota and with the Lithuanian quota (solid and
dashed graphs) are matching and correspond to the costs C
′
F . In other words, the
marginal supply costs of LNG set the price in the Lithuanian gas market. However,
at high costs C
′
F , the Lithuanian gas price with the quota of 0.44 bcm/a is lower than
the gas price without a quota. In such situations, private owners of the LNG import
terminal would generate a loss because their expense per imported LNG unit, C
′
F ,
would be above the price in the market. In 2014, the average global LNG price was
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approximately 445 €/1000m3 (International Gas Union, 2015). Hence, LNG prices
above the Lithuanian monopoly price were historically already observed. With an
optimal import quota, the Lithuanian gas price is below the price without a quota
as long as the marginal LNG costs C
′
F are above the dominant supplier’s marginal
costs C
′
D.
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Figure 2.3.: Lithuanian gas price in dependence on C
′
F
Besides gas prices, the influence of the LNG import quota on the Lithuanian con-
sumer surplus adjusted by the payment for the LNG imports is analyzed. Figure 2.4
illustrates the adjusted consumer surplus in dependence on the marginal supply costs
C
′
F . In line with the conventions in the previously discussed diagrams, the function
illustrated by the dashed graph indicates the adjusted consumer surplus with the
Lithuanian import quota of 0.44 bcm/a, whereas the dashed-dotted graph describes
the situation with an optimal quota. The solid graph is the benchmark of no quota.
For values of C
′
F above the monopoly price of 394 €/1000m3, the solid graph cor-
responds to the consumer surplus in the monopoly case. The solid and the dashed
graphs match for low C
′
F when more LNG than 0.44 bcm/a is imported and the
quota is therefore over-fulfilled. However, at high C
′
F , a binding volume quota leads
to additional consumer surplus. While no disadvantages of the quota occur with low
C
′
F , advantages can be realized if high LNG supply costs lead to a situation in which
the dominant supplier could still exercise market power in the absence of minimum
import requirements.
Figure 2.2, Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 suggest that the actual Lithuanian import
quota of 0.44 bcm/a would be below the optimal quota. However, if C
′
F would be
too high, the change in adjusted consumer surplus relative to the monopoly case
could become negative for a given value of a quota. The dashed graph in Figure 2.4
intersects with the solid graph at C
′
F = 535 €/1000m3. For higher C
′
F , the quota of
0.44 bcm/a would not enhance the Lithuanian national welfare anymore. For larger
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Figure 2.4.: Lithuanian adjusted consumer surplus in dependence on C
′
F
quotas than 0.44 bcm/a, this threshold value of C
′
F is lower. For instance, the optimal
quota at the monopoly price of approximately 1.7 bcm (cf. Figure 2.2) would lead to
a negative national welfare effect already at a value of C
′
F = 477€/1000m3. Hence,
committing to import a high minimum volume leads to the risk that the difference
of the adjusted consumer surplus relative to the monopoly case becomes negative
at high C
′
F . Risk averse actors may therefore prefer to commit to a comparably
small volume for the quota. Alternatively, the importers could introduce quotas
with volume flexibility, i.e. require additional imports in situations with low C
′
F and
require reduced imports in situations with high C
′
F .
The construction costs of the Klaipe˙da terminal add up to 101 million EUR, and a
yearly lease of 55.3 million EUR needs to be paid (The Baltic Course, 2015). If we
assume a life time of the investment of 20 years and an exemplary discount rate of
8%, the yearly annuity for the investment costs is 10.3 million EUR. Hence, the total
yearly fixed costs of the terminal amount to 65.3 million EUR. The benchmark of the
consumer surplus in the monopoly case is 411 million EUR. As can be seen in Fig-
ure 2.4, the additional consumer surplus due to the LTC of 0.44 bcm/a is in the same
range as the total yearly fixed costs of the terminal if C
′
F is in the range between 380
and 400 €/1000m3. At C ′F below 380 €/1000m3, the quota of 0.44 bcm/a would
be over-fulfilled. Nevertheless, the consumer surplus would increase significantly
compared to the monopoly case due to the competitiveness of the LNG imports.
Figure 2.5 shows the development of the welfare (with consideration of the pro-
ducer surplus of the dominant supplier and the fringe firms) in the cases without an
import quota for LNG, with a quota of 0.44 bcm/a and with an optimal quota. It
can be seen that the imposition of a binding quota leads generally to a lower welfare
compared to the case without a quota (cf. A.1 for a formal discussion of the welfare
implications of a quota). In the monopolistic case, the welfare amounts to 1.2 billion
20
2.4. Application to the Lithuanian Natural Gas Market
EUR. With perfect competition (the dominant supplier and the fringe firms bid their
marginal supply costs), however, the welfare would be at 1.6 billion EUR.
300 350 400 450 500 550
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1 000
1 100
1 200
1 300
Marginal LNG Costs C′F [EUR/1000m3]
W
el
fa
re
[M
io
.
EU
R
]
Diagramm 5
without quota
0.44 bcm/a quota
optimal quota
Figure 2.5.: Welfare in dependence on C
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F
While it is intuitive that the total welfare is lowered by the quota, our analysis
shows that the national welfare in Lithuania could be enhanced by this measure.
Besides the economic advantages, an additional positive effect of the quota is an
increased security of supply in Lithuania due to the diversification of supplies (away
from Russian gas).
2.4.4. Discussion of Results
In order to evaluate the Lithuanian strategy to mitigate Gazprom’s market power,
alternative concepts to reduce market power should be considered. Such other po-
tential strategies include, e.g., a further integration of markets by additional pipeline
connections10, gas release auctions and unbundling of the dominant supplier. Eco-
nomic theory indicates that the most efficient way to mitigate market power would
be to set a maximum price being equal to the marginal supply costs of the dominant
supplier if those were known. From a practical point of view, however, unilateral
actions of authorities (e.g. regulator, government) against the dominant supplier
potentially give rise to the risk that the dominant supplier cuts off the supply. In
particular, in markets for products with limited substitution options and high values
of lost load, e.g. in energy markets, taking such a risk could be costly. Therefore, a
practicable option to mitigate market power is to incentivize the entry of new sup-
pliers instead of taking direct actions against the dominant supplier.
10In principle, competitively priced pipeline gas could have been incentivized in Lithuania instead of
LNG. However, Gazprom had also a dominant position in the markets of the neighboring Poland
and Latvia leading to comparably high gas prices in those countries (European Commission, 2014).
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Figure 2.6.: Historical development of the Lithuanian weighted average import gas price
Source: Lithuanian National Commission for Energy Control and Prices (2017); vertical
dotted line in December 2014 illustrates when the Lithuanian LNG terminal came online
As can be seen in Figure 2.6, gas prices in Lithuania decreased indeed signifi-
cantly in 2015 and 2016 compared to 2014. In 2015, the LTC for LNG was binding,
whereas Lithuania imported more than the contracted volumes in 2016. It would be
interesting to test empirically the theoretical prediction that a binding LTC led to a
higher adjusted consumer surplus in Lithuania in 2015 compared to a counterfactual
situation without a minimum import quota. However, a development parallel to the
commencing LNG imports was the decrease in global oil prices. Because Russian
LTCs in Europe were still coupled to oil prices, this led generally to a lower level of
Russian LTC prices (European Commission, 2015). Hence, even in the absence of
LNG supplies, Russia may not have been able to enforce a monopoly price in 2015
and 2016 due to its contractual obligations. Additionally, because of substitution
effects between natural gas and biofuels (Pakalkaité, 2016), the structure of the de-
mand function for natural gas could have changed after 2014. Hence, empirically
disentangling the different price decreasing effects in the Lithuanian gas market after
2014 is left for further research.
2.5. Conclusion
This analysis explains the economic rationale to incentivize the import of LNG in
isolated gas markets like Lithuania by a minimum import quota. Before building
the LNG terminal, Russia had a monopoly for natural gas in Lithuania, which led to
high gas prices. In such a situation, supplier diversification can increase the national
welfare due to a decrease in prices. If the price of LNG available at the global market
is in the range of the marginal supply costs of the dominant supplier, the profitabil-
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ity of the LNG terminal can be ensured without market intervention. The analysis
at hand, however, focuses on a situation in which the fringe volumes have higher
marginal supply costs compared to the dominant supplier leading to a situation in
which the dominant supplier can still exercise market power despite the existence
of alternative supplies. It is shown that a minimum volume quota for the high-cost
fringe leads to an increase in the consumer surplus adjusted by a compensation paid
to the fringe firms. For a specific market situation, an optimal quota, from the point
of view of the importing country, can be found. As a policy implication, countries
with gas markets with dominant suppliers other than Lithuania could also consider
to incentivize the import of competitively priced gas, ideally with flexible volume
quotas.
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3. Turkey’s role in natural gas – Becoming a
transit country?
This chapter analyses the possible future role that Turkey can play in European natu-
ral gas markets. The global gas market equilibrium model COLUMBUS is employed
to assess the outcomes of different scenarios concerning natural gas supply routes
to Europe through Turkey up to 2030. The results imply simply that under current
conditions leading to low prices, i.e., tendency of European market to move towards
a competitive environment, Turkey’s role would be of only minor importance. In
accordance with various scenarios presented in this chapter, Turkey’s role is seen
at its most important if European future demand is more than the projected and if
the movement of European gas markets towards a competitive environment breaks
down.
3.1. Introduction
Turkey’s long-lasting ambition to become a natural gas transit country, if not a hub,
has been motivated by the country’s unique geographical location as a natural bridge
between major gas producers in the Caspian, Middle Eastern and Russian regions
and one of the major consumers, Europe. Turkey’s importance and the likelihood
of her being a transit country have remained relatively high during the periods of
possible threats to sustainable natural gas supplies to Europe. To date continental
Europe is one of the largest natural gas consuming regions in the world. According to
BP (2014), after increasing from 338.1 billion cubic meters (bcm, hereafter) in 1991,
annual natural gas consumption in the European Union 28 (EU, hereafter) peaked
with 502.2 bcm in 2010. Although there has been a slight decrease since then, the
International Energy Agency’s (IEA, hereafter) 2015 World Energy Outlook (WEO
2015, hereafter) New Policies Scenario estimates that natural gas demand in Europe
will increase by an annual compound rate of 0.7% reaching 610 bcm by 2040 (IEA
(2015a)). Most of this demand will be met by imports, as has so far been the case.
Indeed, European import dependency is expected to grow even more rapidly due to
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declining local production in countries such as the Netherlands and the UK.1 WEO
2015 also suggests that Russia will continue to be the major source of natural gas
supplies to Europe.
The issue of import dependency, especially on Russia, and its implications for Eu-
ropean energy security has been widely discussed by academia and policy makers.2
With the 2009 Russian-Ukrainian dispute over gas prices, import diversity emerged
as an increasingly important item on the European policy makers’ agenda. The
Crimean crisis, which began five years later and was followed by disruptions in gas
supplies over Ukraine and western sanctions against Russian companies and indi-
viduals, reactivated the issue of European natural gas supply security and import
route diversity. In 2013, almost 50% of all gas imports from Russia passed through
Ukraine (Martinez et al. (2015)). This constituted nearly 15% of total gas imports
to the EU for the same year.3 Annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russia along
with an already existing Russian-Ukrainian gas price dispute increased the fears of
disruptions to EU gas supplies.
A vast amount of literature has evaluated the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian
crises in 2009 and 2014 both qualitatively and quantitatively.4 Among the qual-
itative contributions, Pirani et al. (2009), for instance, emphasised that concerns
about the reliability of Russian supplies as well as the Ukrainian transit route have
increased among European policy makers as a result of the 2009 crisis. Chyong and
Hobbs (2014) argued that European countries should engage more in reforming
the Ukrainian gas sector rather than trying to restrict Russia’s aim of using natu-
ral gas as a political weapon or for leverage. In addition, more recently Stulberg
(2015) stated that the Russian strategy to use gas for political leverage failed due
to significant changes in global energy markets. There also exist a number of arti-
cles that have tried to quantify the effects of Russian disruptions using various sce-
nario analyses/modelling techniques. For instance, Lochner (2011c) simulated the
2009 Russian-Ukrainian crisis and found out that threats to European supply secu-
1According to the report share of imports in annual natural gas demand of European Union will
increase from the current level of nearly 65% to 81% by 2040 IEA (2015a).
2See for instance, Correljé and van der Linde (2006); Mañé-Estrada (2006); Costantini et al. (2007);
Reymond (2007); Spanjer (2007); Weisser (2007); Finon and Locatelli (2008); Remme et al.
(2008); Sagen and Tsygankova (2008); Bilgin (2009); Hedenus et al. (2010); Monforti and Szik-
szai (2010); Söderbergh et al. (2010); Umbach (2010); Bilgin (2011a,b); Boussena and Locatelli
(2013); Growitsch et al. (2014); Flouri et al. (2015); Hecking et al. (2016).
3Please note that the crisis in 2014 led to a significant decrease in these shares.
4See, for instance, Pirani et al. (2009), Abada and Massol (2011), Bilgin (2011b), Roth (2011), Belyi
(2012), Balmaceda (2013), Behrens and Wieczorkiewicz (2014), Chyong (2014), Hecking (2014),
Holz et al. (2014), Pirani (2014), Pirani et al. (2014), Richter and Holz (2014), Zachmann (2014),
Martinez et al. (2015), Stulberg (2015).
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rity were mitigated thanks to significant storage volumes. Moreover, Hecking et al.
(2014) consider that Russian gas supply disruption, which continued for at least six
months, would have profound effects on European gas security and that nine months
of disruption could possibly cause a 46 bcm deficit in total European supplies. More
recently, Martinez et al. (2015) provided a comprehensive assessment of the Russo-
Ukraine crises and argued that the 2014 crisis did not impact too much on North
Western European markets, thanks mostly to the Nord Stream pipeline which was
built after 2009 crisis. However, the authors also stress that Southern and Eastern
European countries are still vulnerable to any supply disruptions over the Ukraine
transit route.
Under these circumstances, Turkey has been referred to as the most plausible al-
ternative route for carrying Russian gas resources to Southern and South-eastern
Europe. The Crimean Annexation followed by EU sanctions and doubts over can-
cellation of the Nord Stream pipeline expansion led to a major policy change on
the Russian side, i.e. cancellation of the South Stream project and initiation of the
TurkStream project in December 2014.5 This was a significant turning point for
Turkey in terms of becoming an essential player in the global gas market. Turkey’s
role was expected to increase not only due to the TurkStream project but also new
supplies from Iran, the Kurdistan region of Iraq and the Eastern Mediterranean off-
shore fields, coming online in global gas markets for the first time. There has been
a vast amount of literature on Turkey’s possible role for European energy supply
security and on her future as an energy transit country or hub.6 Erdogdu (2010),
for instance, analyses the European dependency on Russian gas and points out the
possible positive implications of the once planned Nabucco project for European
supply security. According to the author, Turkey occupies a significant geographic
position in this respect, yet the availability of gas resources, which would have fed
the Nabucco pipeline, was the determining factor for Turkey’s role. Bilgin (2011a),
moreover, suggests that Turkey’s importance would increase until 2020 if and only
if all European Union member countries adhere to a common energy security, as de-
fined by the EU Commission, and diversify their import sources accordingly. Wigen
5On November 24, 2015 a Russian bomber aircraft was shot down by Turkish jets near the Syr-
ian–Turkish border due to a claimed invasion of the Turkish territories. This was followed by in-
creasing tension between the two countries and unilateral suspension of the project by Russian side.
Yet, then in July 2016, governmental officials from both countries announced that relations would
be back to normal in the short-term and that the project is put back on table. This volatile state of
the relationship between Russia and Turkey sparks up the debate on Turkey’s possible future as a
natural gas hub and her role in European gas supply security.
6See for instance, Fink (2006), Barysch (2007), Bilgin (2007), Babal (2009), Saivetz (2009), Bilgin
(2010), Erdogdu (2010), Roberts (2010), Wigen (2012), Winrow (2013), Yeni (2013), Cohen
(2014), Demiryol (2014), Erdogdu (2014), Karbuz (2014), Tagliapietra (2014a).
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(2012) similarly suggests that, although Turkey’s geographical location offers her a
unique opportunity for the future, realisation of this would depend very much on
political developments in the region and the EU. According to Winrow (2013), be-
coming a major gas transit state is of secondary importance for Turkey’s government,
behind the need to safeguard its own energy security. Yet, the author stresses that
Turkey would become an important component of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC,
hereafter) provided that sufficient gas supplies from northern Iraq, Turkmenistan
and Azerbaijan are available. After a comprehensive analysis, Tagliapietra (2014a)
concludes that Turkey was very unlikely to become a natural gas hub until 2025, yet
she could play an important role if SGC infrastructure projects are realised and if
European demand is high enough. Moreover, Tagliapietra (2014a) stressed that the
2014 Russo-Ukrainian crisis could be an important turning point in EU-Turkey en-
ergy relations as the crisis might rekindle debate on the issue of gas import diversity
among European policy-makers.
Although there are many qualitative contributions, the literature so far fails to deal
with how the recent disputes would quantitatively reshape Turkey’s role in European
gas supply security. Indeed, we are aware of only one quantitative analysis about
Turkey’s role, that of Lise et al. (2008), which focuses on gas corridors affecting the
European natural gas market. The authors suggest that Turkey is in a favourable
position to become an important natural gas transit country and that according to
their ‘Business-as-usual’ scenario there would be 31 bcm of gas transited via Turkey
to Europe by 2030. Yet, the study is quite outdated, considering the recent develop-
ments in international politics and energy markets, e.g., Russian–Ukrainian and Rus-
sian–Turkish crises, the lifting of Iranian sanctions, capacity expansions in northern
Iraqi gas fields. The main contribution of this chapter is, therefore, to quantitatively
show Turkey’s changing role in the light of recent developments. A necessary and
sufficient condition to become a transit country is to have significant amounts of gas
flows over the borders. Yet, it takes a lot more than that to turn a country into a hub
(Berk et al. (2017)). Hence, apart from the discussions on whether Turkey would
become a gas hub for the European market, the main objective of the chapter at hand
is to assess its potential role as a major transit country by quantifying the future east-
west natural gas flows over the country. For this purpose, we use a global gas market
simulation model, COLUMBUS, in accordance with Hecking and Panke (2012). Our
methodology follows a two-fold structure.7 Firstly, we used the COLUMBUS model
to simulate a reference scenario, which is based on current global gas market con-
ditions, over the period until 2030. To this end, we calibrated the model with the
7Please refer to Section 3.2 for details.
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most recent data and in accordance with recent global gas market developments,
such as the US shale gas revolution, decreasing fossil fuel prices and the European
gas market’s tendency to move to a competitive structure. Using this reference sce-
nario, we measured future gas volumes that are supposed to flow through Turkey to
European markets from different sources up to 2030. According to our results, gas
volumes, mostly from Azerbaijan and Iran, transported over Turkey will reach 23.3
bcm/year, which constitutes 4.8% of total European demand, by 2030. Compared
with the current situation this result suggests that Turkey’s future role in natural gas
would be enhanced only slightly.
Secondly, we analysed different scenarios, suggesting various drivers that may in-
crease Turkey’s importance in terms of transit volumes, for instance, higher than
expected European demand, high Iranian production capacity or a European gas
market that is characterised by oligopolistic gas suppliers all of which could change
Turkey’s role. The scenario in which there is higher than expected European de-
mand and an oligopolistic European upstream gas market, to which Russia and its
competitors exert market power, indicates the most important role for Turkey. Ac-
cording to this scenario, by 2030 Turkey’s annual re-exports will reach 37.5 bcm,
6.8% of Europe’s estimated annual demand. Conversely, given current market dy-
namics, low gas prices resulting from a competitive environment in the European
gas market, there is quite a low possibility that the circumstances assumed by this
scenario would exist in the period until 2030.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 briefly introduces the
methodology we have employed. Section 3.3.1 provides detailed results of the refer-
ence scenario. Different drivers that could enhance Turkey’s future role as a natural
gas transit country are featured in Section 3.3.2. Finally, Section 3.4 concludes with
policy implications
3.2. Methodology
The quantitative analyses conducted in this chapter are based on the application
of an economic model simulating the global gas market. This section provides
the methodological setup including a brief description of the model used (Section
3.2.1)8, data employed and assumptions made (Section 3.2.2). We also included
the economic intuition behind the current developments in the global and European
8In this section we provide a brief description of the model. Please refer to the Appendix for the
complete mathematical representation of the model.
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natural gas market structure together with the implications for the model (Section
3.2.3). indices in an ex-post analysis.
3.2.1. Brief Description of the Model
We employ COLUMBUS, a global gas market model, developed Hecking and Panke
(2012).9 COLUMBUS is an inter-temporal partial equilibrium simulation model,
which can derive possible gas market developments up to 2040, using 2014 data
for the in-sample calibration process.10 Although worldwide interdependencies are
taken into account, special focus in this chapter is given to the European gas market.
The model considers various aspects of the global gas market: production, consump-
tion, storage, pipelines and LNG infrastructures. The spatial structure of the model
is formulated in accordance with network-flow. Production and demand regions are
represented by initial and final nodes, whereas liquefaction, re-gasification and stor-
age terminals are represented by intermediate nodes.11 The nodes are connected by
arcs, which represent pipelines and LNG routes. The model takes several parame-
ters regarding production, demand and transportation as exogenous inputs. These
are capacities in production and transportation infrastructure, price elastic demand
function as well as cost for investments or transportation. Furthermore, it reveals
key outputs, such as production, trade flows, demand for investment into production
and transportation infrastructure as well as equilibrium prices among the modelled
gas markets.
COLUMBUS considers different market participants such as natural gas producers,
exporters, LNG facility or storage operators, each trying to maximise profit simul-
taneously. Each individual actor tries to maximise its profit at each instant of time
by having the ability to decide instantaneously on the production quantity at each
production node, the supply quantity to each demand node, as well as the amount
of investment in production, pipeline, LNG and storage facilities. Each agent’s profit
maximisation is subject to several constraints, such as production capacity, pipeline
9COLUMBUS model is developed at the Institute of Energy Economics (EWI) at the University of
Cologne by Hecking and Panke (2012). Moreover, although we are aware of different gas market
models such as that of Egging et al. (2008), Lise et al. (2008), Dieckhöner (2012) the reasoning for
choosing COLUMBUS is that it accounts for several investment decisions, including infrastructure
and production, and a more detailed European infrastructure.
10Although in principle model is available for simulating the gas markets until 2040, we restricted our
attention until 2030 due to data availability.
11All nodes that are included in the model are presented in Appendix B.
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transportation, storage, liquefaction and re-gasification as well as node flow and
demand balances.12
Exporters are the key agents, who create trading connections between produc-
tion and demand nodes whilst competing against each other and being able to exert
market power in demand nodes. The model is designed as a mixed complementarity
programming (MCP) problem similar to that of Egging et al. (2010), which allows
the simulation of the strategic behaviour among individual natural gas exporters,
acting as Cournot players, with different degrees of market power in different de-
mand nodes. In accordance with Perry (1982) and Egging et al. (2008), the market
power is controlled by a conjectural variation parameter varying between 0 and 1,
indicating the degree of market power. As suggested by the equation B.1 in the Ap-
pendix, if conjectural variation is 0, the exporter is treated as a competitive supplier
in the corresponding demand node.
Among the model’s outputs, gas trade flows over capacity constrained pipeline
or LNG routes carried out by individual exporters (determined by the maximization
problem in equation B.1 and B.3). Investments in the existing capacity and into the
new infrastructures (determined by maximization problems in equations B.8, B.12,
B.14, B.15 and B.16) are of significant importance given the research question be-
ing addressed by this chapter. Taking the costs of production, transportation and
investments exogenously, the model endogenously decides how much natural gas
would be produced at each production node and the flow amounts from production
to demand nodes. Therefore, the model also decides about the need of additional
infrastructure capacity in order to realize the resulting gas flows between the pro-
duction and demand regions.
3.2.2. Data and Assumptions
Demand is modelled on country level, assuming linear price elastic demand func-
tion. Data on price elasticity, reference demand and reference price are exogenously
given to the model in order to estimate the demand function using the approach
proposed by Lise et al. (2008). A country’s demand, thereby, is divided into two
sector groups: (1) households and miscellaneous and (2) industry and power gen-
eration. Moreover, the model also assumes that demand price elasticity is varying
12Please refer to the equations B.1–B.35 in the Appendix for the maximization problems of each player
as well as the constraints and first order conditions.
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over different countries as well as different sectors within a country.13 For instance,
while the industry has partly intermittent processes that will reduce natural gas de-
mand when prices are high, household demand depends on heating behaviour not
changing critically in the short term. Hence, the industrial sector is assumed to
have a higher price elasticity of demand than the household sector (Growitsch et al.,
2014). The main sources for the demand data employed in the model are the World
Energy Outlook 2014 (IEA, 2015a), Natural Gas Information 2014 (IEA (2015b)),
the Medium Term Gas Market Report 2014 (IEA (2015b)) and the Ten Year Network
Development Plan 2015 (ENTSOG (2015)). All in all, the model considers 86 de-
mand nodes; i.e. countries or country groups and covers over 95% of global gas
consumption in 2014, which is the year of data calibration.
While demand data is exogenously provided14, the model endogenously deter-
mines the respective production and supply decisions for each producer and ex-
porter. Each exporter has control over at least one production node and each of
these nodes face a capacity constraint at each point in time. The model includes 52
natural gas production nodes each including several gas fields, which accounts for
over 95% of global gas supply. Historical production volumes, which are taken from
Natural Gas Information 2015 (IEA (2015b)), are used as the exogenous production
capacity of each production node at the corresponding year in order to calibrate the
model. Moreover, the model chooses future production quantities and investment
decisions, which would increase the production capacity, that maximise each agent’s
profit. Hence, each production node is subjected to a dynamic capacity constraint,
which is endogenously determined by the production rate and investment into the
capacity at corresponding year (equations B.9-B.11). Sources of the data on pro-
duction parameters includes the WEO 2015 (IEA (2015b)), the Medium Term Gas
Market Report 2015 (IEA (2015a)) and the Ten Year Network Development Plan
2015 (ENTSOG (2015)) as well as individual countries’ corresponding statistical
agencies.
Given its importance for the global gas market, the model covers a comprehen-
sive data set on pipeline, LNG and gas storage infrastructure as well as long-term
contracts (LTCs) between different countries. While infrastructure, either existing
13Although a general price elasticity of demand is assumed for every demand node and sector, after the
in-sample calibration process the individual elasticities for demand nodes and sectors are redefined
(see Lise et al. (2008)).
14Please note that the general level of demand development is an input to the model. However,
since the COLUMBUS model is an equilibrium model, the equilibrium consumption is an output of
the model and can deviate slightly from the input path. It is driven by price elasticities that are
employed in the demand function.
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or under development15, is exogenously given, the model is able to invest endoge-
nously into new infrastructure, as mentioned above. Data on existing pipelines were
collected from the Ten Year Network Development Plan 2015 (ENTSOG (2015)), on
LNG infrastructure were gathered from the Retail LNG Handbook 2015 published
by the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (GIIGNL (2015)) and
from publications of Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE and ENTSOG (2016)). Reports
of Gas Storage Europe (GIE (2015)) and the Natural Gas Information 2015 (IEA
(2015b)) served as the main data sources for gas storage facilities.
Finally, a detailed database on LTCs was developed using different sources, such
as the literature survey by Neumann et al. (2015) and publications from the Interna-
tional Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (GIIGNL). The model distinguishes
different LTCs with take-or-pay (TOP) quantity or annual contracted quantity (ACQ).
LTCs are exogenously given to the model as either existing or contracted volumes.
As represented in equation B.35 LTC volumes are included in the market clearing
constraint hence the amount of gas received by a demand node via LTCs is reduced
from the demand to find the amount of gas needed to be supplied to that specific
demand node. Hence, future traded volumes between two nodes include already
existing or contracted LTC volumes. Moreover, since LTCs are purely exogenous, we
did not control for negotiation processes.
3.2.3. Market Structure in European Gas Market: Oligopoly vs.
Competitive
There seems to be consensus in energy economics literature that the upstream sector
of the global natural gas market (Growitsch et al. (2014)), and in particular the
European market (Mathiesen et al. (1987)), has always been best represented by
an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly with a competitive fringe. Market imperfection
was attributed to the high import dependency of European countries on a small
number of exporters, e.g., Russia, Norway, the Netherlands and Algeria to some
certain extent (Abada et al. (2013)). Russia, in particular, is recognised as the major
supplier, which can exert certain market power to European, specifically eastern
European, countries. Therefore, following the literature, we have constructed our
model such that main suppliers, e.g., Russia, Norway, Netherlands and Algeria, can
exert market power on European gas markets while others behave competitively,
which creates an oligopoly with competitive fringe market structure.
15As well as projects with financial investment decision (FID) status based on ENTSOG (2015).
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Yet, in the aftermath of the 2008/09 global economic crisis, there have been re-
markable changes in the European gas market’s structure. Increasing energy effi-
ciency and the transition to renewable energy sources, thanks to high fossil fuel
prices during the period between 2000 and 2008, followed by economic stagnation
resulting from the crisis put downward pressure on gas demand growth in Europe.
This might have already threatened Russia’s position and power in the European gas
market. Furthermore, the American shale gas revolution over the last years would
further reduce European dependence on Russian gas through two channels. Firstly,
expansion in US shale gas capacity drove Henry Hub gas prices down increasing the
competitiveness of gas in the US power sector, which in turn led to huge amounts
of US coal being available for export. As a result, worldwide coal prices decreased
making coal even more competitive in the European power sector, which further re-
duced gas demand. Secondly, as the US moved from being a major importer to an
exporter or at least self-sufficient consumer, global LNG overcapacities start to be
redirected towards European markets.
All of these developments have driven and may further drive European gas prices
down, especially in the spot market. Along with low oil prices since mid-2014, this
threatened the future of long-lasting oil indexation pricing and long-term contracts,
as consumers started to move towards spot LNG purchases.16 As correctly noted
by Henderson and Mitrova (2015), the most important implication of these devel-
opments is that the European market is moving to a competitive structure. Russia
would have a tendency to hold gas prices low, both for contracted and future vol-
umes, in order to maintain her share in the European market and to compete with
the LNG spot market. Due to these recent developments, we assume that the Eu-
ropean gas market will become competitive. Hence, in our reference scenario we
have adjusted the conjectural variation parameter for the Cournot suppliers of Eu-
rope such that Russia and its competitors act competitively and hence exerting less
market power compared to the pre-2014 European market. A different scenario en-
titled “Higher European Demand & Oligopolistic European Market” later relaxes this
assumption.
16Please Stern (2009) on a comprehensive analyses of oil-indexed pricing and LTCs in European gas
market.
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3.3. Results
3.3.1. Reference Scenario Results
The reference scenario of this chapter is based on projections made by the New Poli-
cies Scenario of WEO 2015 of IEA (2015a) and is built to capture current conditions
in the global gas market, as explained in Section 3.2.3. Given our chapter’s objec-
tive, this section provides certain gas market projections regarding Turkey. Figure
3.1, for instance, represents Turkey’s natural gas consumption from 1985 until 2014
(solid line) and the model forecast until 2030 (dotted line). According to the model
Turkey’s annual consumption will rise from 48.5 bcm in 2014 to 65.5 bcm in 2023.
In accordance with WEO 2015, the annual growth rate of demand will decline after
2023 yet the demand will still reach 67.2 bcm by 2030.
There have been a number of studies forecasting Turkey’s gas demand, including
those from state institutions as well as from academia.17 For instance, BOTAS¸, the
Turkish national pipeline grid operator, estimated in 2008 that the country’s natural
gas demand will increase to 76.4 bcm by 2030 (BOTAS, 2008). Melikoglu (2013),
moreover, using two different models estimated that demand will rise to 76.8 bcm
(linear model) or 83.8 bcm (logistic model) by 2030. More recently, Ozdemir et al.
(2016) forecasted that Turkey’s annual natural gas consumption will increase to
around 89 bcm in a high economic performance scenario and to around 56 bcm in
a low economic performance scenario.18 The fact that our model estimated lower
natural gas demand than the previous estimates can be attributed to the recent con-
traction in Turkish economy.
Given that Turkey has low indigenous production and is, therefore, highly depen-
dent on imported natural gas, it is worthwhile analysing the model’s forecast about
which natural gas source countries would supply the Turkish market (Table 3.1).
There are currently five main sources that import natural gas into Turkey, namely
the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Iran, Nigeria and Algeria (BOTAS, 2014). In
2014, for instance, 98% of Turkey’s 49.8 bcm of natural gas consumption was im-
ported from these five source countries with the following shares: Russia 56%, Iran
17Please refer to Melikoglu (2013) for a comprehensive literature review on natural gas consumption
forecasts in Turkey.
18The authors provided the forecasted figures in million tonnes of oil equilvalent (mtoe) unit. Their
forecasted volumes for high economic performance is 80 mtoe and for low economic performance is
50 mtoe. According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2016 the approximate conversion
factors, 1 million toe of natural gas is around 1.11 bcm. Hence, 80 mtoe and 50 mtoe can be
calculated as 88.8 bcm and 55.5 bcm, respectively (BP, 2016).
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Figure 3.1.: Turkey’s Natural Gas Consumption 1985-2015 and COLUMBUS’ forecast until
2035
Data: Historical consumption data between 1985-2010 BP (2014), model calibration data between 2010-2014
from WEO 2015 of EIA (2015) and 2015-2035 model forecast.
19%, Azerbaijan 9%, Algeria 9% and Nigeria 7% (TPAO, 2014). The reference sce-
nario, moreover, estimates that in 2017 out of these sources Russia would stay as
the major exporter to Turkey by supplying 31 bcm of natural gas. The following
three import sources would be Iran (9.7 bcm), Azerbaijan (8.3 bcm) as well as LNG
imports from Nigeria and Algeria together with spot market purchases (a total of
5.1 bcm). According to the reference scenario, the composition of import diversity
would alter significantly throughout the next 15 years. For instance, although Rus-
sia stays as the major source for Turkey with 35.3 bcm in 2030, her share of total
imports will decline to 38.9% while that of Azerbaijan will increase dramatically
to 34.8% (31.5 bcm).19 By 2030 the third largest supplier would be Iran with 10.2
bcm, comprising 11.3% of total imports. The reference scenario also estimates slight
increases in Iraqi and LNG imports over time.
According to Table 3.1, Turkey’s total imports, including existing and contracted
LTCs, will rise from around 54.1 bcm in 2017 to 90.5 bcm in 2030. Yet these vol-
umes are not only for Turkey’s own demand, which is supposed to increase to 67.2
bcm by 2030, but they also include re-exports from Turkey to Greece and Bulgaria
(Table 3.1). According to the reference scenario, by 2030 there will be around 23.3
19Please note that these volumes are not only already existing long-term contracts (LTC, hereafter)
but they also include estimates for future volumes. Future estimated volumes can either be LTC
or spot trading. Note also that already existing LTC’s have certain due dates. For instance in 2015
Turkey would import around 48 bcm gas due to existing LTC contracts, yet this volume will be only
around 14 bcm in 2030. The remainder is to be imported using either new LTCs or the spot market.
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bcm of gas re-exports from Turkey to Europe (9.2 bcm via Bulgaria and 14.1 bcm
via Greece). This amount corresponds to around 4.8% of total European gas con-
sumption, which is estimated by the model to be around 490 bcm by 2030.20 From
2020 onwards according to the model Turkey will start to contribute more than
2.5% of European gas supplies. Although these shares correspond to a very small
volume of gas compared with the current situation, this would enhance Turkey’s
role in Europe’s gas supply security. In particular, Caspian natural gas sources that
flow through Turkey would make a contribution to South-Eastern European markets,
which are still characterised by a strong import dependency on Russian gas.
The in and out-flows presented in table 3.1 will be made possible only with a cer-
tain infrastructure, especially pipelines, and investment. One of the most important
contributions made by the COLUMBUS model is that it estimates the annual demand
for additional pipeline capacities between countries. According to the reference sce-
nario, by 2030 there will be a total of 58 bcm additional capacity from the natural
gas infrastructure network connecting Turkey to different countries (Table 3.2). The
largest estimated pipeline capacity additions are: the Georgia–Turkey pipeline, car-
rying Azerbaijani and Turkmen gas, with a total capacity addition of 20.1 bcm, which
can be attributed to a capacity addition to TAP/TANAP pipeline, the Russia–Turkey
pipeline with a total capacity addition of 19.7 bcm and the Turkey–Bulgaria pipeline
with a total capacity addition of 9.3 bcm.
Out of these, the Russia–Turkey pipeline investment is of significant importance.
This 19.7 bcm of additional capacity can easily be attributed to the TurkStream
project, with the pipeline planned to have a capacity of 31.5 bcm/year, 14 bcm of
which is intended to feed Turkey’s own demand with the rest being re-exported to
Europe.21 Hence, given that Turkey’s own consumption would increase to 6 bcm by
2030, according to the reference scenario the TurkStream project would serve only
Turkey’s own needs and would not contribute to its ambition to become a gas transit
country. Indeed, this can be directly concluded by looking at the inflows provided
on Table 3.1. The model estimates that there would be no gas flows from Bulgaria;
hence the pipeline with 19.7 bcm of capacity would be built in order to offset the
transit volumes from Russia to Turkey through Ukraine and Bulgaria. Furthermore,
instead of transiting natural gas via Turkey, Russia would invest in an additional
20Here, European consumption refers to the total amount of projected consumption in European con-
tinent, excluding Turkey. Countries included are Austria, the Baltic countries, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Sweden, Slovenia,
Slovakia, the United Kingdom, Yugoslavia
21http://turkstream.info. Access date: 30.09.2016
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Table 3.1.: Turkish Gas Flow Balance Including Already Existing and Contracted LTCs by
Source Country (all figures in bcm)
2017 2020 2023 2025 2030
From Russia (through the Black Sea)* 16.0 33.9 34.7 33.9 35.3
From Russia (through Bulgaria)** 15.0 0.1 2.0 0.0 0.0
From Azerbaijan (through Georgia)*** 8.3 23.3 29.2 31.5 31.5
From Iran 9.7 6.3 5.0 7.4 10.2
From Iraq 0.0 1.2 0.2 0.0 4.1
From Israel 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4
Total Pipeline Gas Imports 49.0 64.8 71.2 72.8 81.5
LNG from Algeria 2.4 2.4 2.4 0.0 0.0
LNG from Nigeria 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
LNG from Spot 1.6 5.5 6.9 9.4 9.0
Total LNG Imports 5.1 9.0 9.3 9.4 9.0
Total Gas Imports 54.1 73.8 80.5 82.3 90.5
Turkey’s own Demand 54.1 61.5 65.5 65.3 67.2
To Bulgaria 0.0 1.6 3.3 4.6 9.2
To Greece 0.0 10.7 11.8 12.4 14.1
Total Gas Re-exports 0.0 12.3 15.0 17.0 23.3
Share of Gas Re-exports in Europe’s consumption† 0.0% 2.5% 3.1% 3.5% 4.8%
Notes: Figures include contracted LTC’s over Turkey, e.g. from Azerbaijan to Greece and further to Italy (TAP
Project).
* We did not differentiate between TurkStream and Blue Stream since future volumes may be carried either by
using already existing Blue Stream and by enhancing its capacity or by investing into new project, i.e. TurkStream.
** There are in principle other source countries that can feed Turkey through Bulgaria yet the model in the reference
scenario estimates that the volumes that are transported from Bulgaria to Turkey will be Russian originated.
*** Azerbaijan LTCs involve 3 contracts to Turkey: Phase I and BIL, which are already operational and Phase II,
which comes online in 2018 (Source: BOTAS¸ Official Website).
† Total European gas consumption (projected) excluding Turkey (Countries: Austria, Baltic countries, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, the United King-
dom, Yugoslavia)
pipeline to run through the Black Sea directly to Bulgaria. The project, also known
as South Stream22, which has often been discussed in the past, would enable Russia
to create a direct connection to the EU without passing through an additional transit
country. However, in the reference scenario the model identifies a demand only for
an additional capacity investment of 7 bcm/year. The official project capacity was
planned to be 63 bcm/year.
Another important outcome of the model is that there would be 13.4 bcm/year
of additional pipeline capacity investment from Turkey to Europe (Bulgaria and
22Project was cancelled in 2015 due to political reasons. However, due to the model not considering
political assumptions and being purely based on economic rational, a direct investment via the
Black Sea to Bulgaria is suggested.
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Table 3.2.: Demand for Additional Pipeline Investments Connecting Turkey
bcm/year 2020 2023 2025 2030 Total
From Russia 18.3 0.5 0.9 19.7
From Iran 0.2 0.2
From Iraq 1.2 2.9 4.1
From Georgia* 11.7 6.0 2.3 0.1 20.1
From Israel 0.1 0.3 0.4
To Greece* 2.1 0.3 1.7 4.1
To Bulgaria 1.9 1.4 1.8 4.2 9.3
Notes: The numbers represent the demand for capacity additions under the corresponding year. Total amounts are
the total added capacity between two countries from 2015 to 2030.
* The TANAP+TAP pipeline is not part of the investment decision because it is already under construction and
given exogenously to the model
Greece) by 2030. This additional pipeline would carry mostly Azerbaijani and to
some certain extent Iraqi gas to European markets.
In summary, the reference case scenario estimates that there would be significant
increases in gas import volumes from Azerbaijan as well as the LNG spot market and
Turkey’s role in European gas supply security would slightly increase due to some
of the imported volumes being directed as re-exports to Greece and Bulgaria. These
results seem to be conceivable, given the vast natural gas resources existing in Azer-
baijan and current developments in global gas markets leading to lower LNG prices,
thereby increasing the competitive advantage of LNG over pipeline gas. Hence, the
most important portion of imports will serve to meet the country’s own demand. This
result is also consistent with the agenda of Turkish policy-makers, whose priority is
to secure adequate supplies for Turkey’s internal market. In order for Turkey to be-
come a reliable partner in European gas supply security, more gas volumes from the
countries mentioned above or other sources, such as Iraq or Iran, must feed Turkey’s
re-export volumes. The reference scenario notably estimates that some Iraqi gas will
start flowing across Turkish borders as early as 2020 and by 2030 its import volumes
will increase slightly to 4.1 bcm/year, equivalent to Iraq’s total export capacity by
then.
What is unexpected about the results, though, is that although the sanctions are
being lifted, there would be no significant increase in imports from Iran, which is
supposed to be one of the major suppliers in the Southern Gas Corridor (Tagliapietra,
2014a). It is valuable, therefore, to shed more light on the economic intuitions be-
hind the Iranian results and their implications for Turkey in its ambitions to become
an important gas transit country. One of the main reasons for Iran’s low export vol-
umes to Turkey is to do with its own domestic consumption. In line with WEO 2015,
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the model estimates that Iran’s annual natural gas consumption will grow gradually
from the current level of around 170 bcm to around 250 bcm by 2030. This huge
increase may be attributed to recent political developments, namely the lifting of
sanctions, which will result in increasing Iranian economic activity. One other key
source of demand for Iranian natural gas is the upstream oil industry. Due to the
geological structure of petroleum reservoirs in the country, natural gas is re-injected
into oil fields as an enhanced oil recovery technique. Hence, the country is also con-
suming considerable amount of natural gas in order to maintain its oil production
(Moryadee, 2015, Stevens, 2015).
Indeed, to satisfy its own needs, the model further estimates that Iran would be
importing more than 10 bcm of gas from Turkmenistan from year 2020 onwards.
This amount more or less equates with the gas exports to Turkey. The model also
estimates that starting from 2020 Iran would be exporting some volumes of gas to
India via Pakistan (reaching around 11.7 bcm by 2030) to enjoy better market prices
than would be available from the European market. According to the model, India’s
equilibrium market prices would be on average around 30% higher than Turkish
prices until 2030. Moreover, although Iranian officials often refer to LNG as one
other option for exporting the country’s gas resources23, the model’s reference case
scenario does not estimate significant increases in Iran’s LNG export capacity. This
may be attributed to prohibitively high sunk costs related to LNG infrastructure, i.e.,
liquefaction and re-gasification terminals, and already existing overcapacity in the
global LNG market.
Although according to the model the economic importance of Iran will remain
relatively low, Turkmenistan would rise as a major supplier, along with Azerbaijan,
in the Southern Gas Corridor. The model estimates huge increases in Turkmenistan’s
annual production, from around 82 bcm in 2014 to 162 bcm in 2030. This enor-
mous increase in the country’s production can be attributed to the vast gas resources
yet to be developed. According to the model Turkmenistan will start investing in an
upstream gas industry starting from 2020 when the gas prices all over the world
start to increase. The model estimates that there are two main export destinations
for the Turkmen gas, Eastern Asia (India and China) and Turkey. In 2030 Turk-
menistan will be sending over 50 bcm of natural gas to India and China via Pakistan
through the TAPI24 pipeline and Kazakhstan. There exists one route over which Turk-
23See for instance Natural Gas Europe (2015a,b,c).
24TAPI is the abbreviation for Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline. The pipeline is
planned with a capacity of 33 bcm/a. The model suggests a demand for investment of 50 bcm/a.
Thus, the planned capacity is undersized.
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Figure 3.2.: Estimated Gas Flows through Turkey in 2030 – Reference Scenario
menistan can deliver gas to Turkey, which is via Azerbaijan and Georgia. By 2030
Turkmenistan will start delivering 7.2 bcm via Azerbaijan, for which the model fur-
ther estimates that there will be a new pipeline connection between Turkmenistan
and Azerbaijan with a capacity of 7.2 bcm/year. This pipeline can be attributed to the
planned Trans-Caspian pipeline, whose capacity is estimated to be 30 bcm/year.25
3.3.2. Drivers for Turkey’s potential to become transit country
The results of the reference scenario so far suggest that Turkey’s importance as a
transit route in European supply security will only slightly increase over the period
under investigation. In 2030, for instance, Turkey would re-export 23.3 bcm of gas to
Bulgaria and Greece, contributing only 4.8% of total European consumption, while
her imports would rise to 90.5 bcm (Figure 3.2). Furthermore, according to the
results these re-exported gas volumes would be originated mostly from Azerbaijan
and Iran, while Russian gas will be consumed within the Turkish domestic market.
As aforementioned, the reference scenario is based on the fact that the current
economic conditions within the global and European gas markets would sustain in
the medium term. On the other hand, there could be some developments which
could alter the role of Turkey compared to the reference scenario. In this section, we
investigate under which conditions Turkey’s role would increase and in doing so we
25The model is used here is an economic optimisation model hence does not adjust for political condi-
tions. In the case of Trans-Caspian pipeline, although it is an economically viable project, it would
be politically difficult to materialise due to the border conflicts between Caspian countries. Please
see O’Lear (2004) and Madani et al. (2014) for further discussion on the Caspian dispute.
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Figure 3.3.: Estimations of natural gas transportation over Turkey to Europe until 2030 un-
der different scenarios
consider different scenarios, which allow us to detect drivers for higher natural gas
transits via Turkey. Figure 3.3 represents the gas transportation amounts over Turkey
to Europe until 2030 obtained by the simulations of five main scenarios, namely (1)
Reference Scenario, (2) High European Demand & Oligopolistic European Market,
(3) No Nord Stream Expansion, (4) High Iranian Production, and (5) Lower Turkish
Demand.
As mentioned earlier, currently the European gas market is moving towards a
competitive environment, due to the over-capacity of LNG directed to Europe in-
stead of the US, thanks to the shale revolution, leading prices to decline. On the
other hand, low gas prices may have profound positive effects on future expected
demand. Furthermore, there are several other drivers that can generate higher Eu-
ropean demand, as for instance a fuel switch in power markets due to the higher
prices within the EU-ETS. Accordingly, we analysed to what extent an increase in
European demand would affect Turkish gas transits by 2030.26 Results reveal that
there will be only 1.5 bcm/year of additional transits via Turkey compared with the
reference scenario. The increase in European demand would, therefore, mostly be
covered by LNG and increasing Russian supplies. Hence, the benefit to Turkey of an
increased European demand is relatively minor.
26In this scenario, we assumed that European demand will be 20% more than the demand projected
by the reference scenario. Please note that Turkey is also included in the European continent hence
its demand is subjected to increases also by a further 20%.
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Moreover, if gas prices stay relatively low in the medium term, US shale investment
would decline leading the country to become an importer again. Consequently, a
supply glut of LNG, based on global overcapacities which is expected to put Europe in
a good position, would be over. Along with the demand increase this would increase
Russian share in European gas supply and hence its market power in European gas
markets, which would push the European market to an oligopolistic structure. We
constructed a scenario, therefore, in which Russia and its main competitors act in
an oligopolistic way to enforce higher prices. It can be shown that if this is the case,
European demand for gas from the Southern Gas Corridor increases. The results of
this scenario, in which we assume imperfect competition in European market along
with strong European demand27, illustrate that Turkey’s re-exported gas volumes
to Europe would increase significantly to 37.5 bcm/year, contributing almost 7% of
the European gas demand by 2030. Provided that Russia is withholding production
capacity due to its oligopolistic behaviour, most of this 37.5 bcm would be supplied
by other countries: Azerbaijan (19 bcm), Iran (7.5 bcm), Turkmenistan (5 bcm) and
Iraq (1.3 bcm). Compared with the 23.3 bcm/year in the reference scenario, this
would indicate a greater likelihood for the Southern Gas Corridor to feed Turkey’s
ambitions of becoming an important natural gas transit country. Yet, the assumptions
borne in these scenarios are not very likely to occur in the short-term given current
conditions in global and European gas markets.
Furthermore, there has been much debate about the possible cancellation of a
Nord Stream expansion due to various political issues between Russia and the EU,
including the Crimean annexation and the Syrian dispute. Considering these is-
sues, we considered a case where no expansion in the Nord Stream pipeline was
assumed. The results of this scenario in comparison to the reference scenario, sug-
gest that Russia would use already existing gas infrastructure in Ukraine to feed the
demand shortage for Central and Western Europe. The simulation results suggest
no demand for investment into an additional pipeline from Russia to Turkey and fur-
ther to Europe (i.e., TurkStream). This illustrates that the potential pipeline projects
Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream are not in competition with each other. Moreover,
the results within this scenario show that there would be no significant change in
the gas volumes that are transited through Turkey from other sources, namely Iran,
Azerbaijan and Iraq.
In the next step we analysed the impact on global gas markets of lifting Iranian
sanctions and in particular how Turkish gas transits would be affected. It is assumed,
27In this scenario, in addition to the 20% more demand, we adjusted the conjectural variation of main
suppliers of Europe such that they have more market power than the reference scenario.
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therefore, that Iranian production capacity is higher than in the reference scenario28,
thus allowing Iran to export higher volumes of gas. However, results show that
Iranian exports to Europe via Turkey would increase only slightly up to 4.3 bcm
by 2030, compared with 3.9 bcm in the reference scenario. Instead of exporting
via new, high cost infrastructure in Turkey to the European market, Iran decides to
invest in infrastructure to Pakistan and India. Due to stronger demand growth and,
therefore, higher price signals, these countries are of greater interest to Iran. In total
Turkish re-exports to Europe would increase only slightly by 0.3 bcm by 2030.
Finally, variations in Turkish demand29 and their effects on Turkish transit volumes
are analysed. It is easy to foresee an overall worsening of the Turkish economy in
the future due to, for instance, internal political disputes, terrorist attacks and their
implications on the tourism sector, together with depreciation of the Turkish lira
against the US dollar and Euro.30 Compared with the reference scenario, lower
Turkish domestic demand would lead to additional re-exports to Europe of 3.4 bcm
by 2030. Thus, the development of Turkish demand has only a small effect on the
country’s transit amounts. The reason is that Russia acts as a swing supplier to the
Turkish market and Turkey’s demand reduction is merely balanced out mainly by a
reduction in Russian supplies. Because Russia prefers direct connections to Europe,
for instance through South Stream, the change in Turkish transit volumes would be
low.
3.4. Conclusion and Policy Implications
This chapter has aimed to assess quantitatively Turkey’s future role for the Euro-
pean natural gas market. For this purpose we used COLUMBUS, a global gas market
simulation model, to conduct several scenarios regarding Turkey. Results from our-
reference scenario imply that Turkey’s role would increase only slightly until 2030,
by which time 23.3 bcm of natural gas, originating mostly from Azerbaijan, Turk-
menistan and Iran, would flow across Turkish borders to European markets. Al-
though these values are not high enough to conclude that Turkey could turn into an
important natural gas transit country, according to the reference scenario Turkish
28It is assumed that Iranian production capacity is 20% higher, for instance due to higher foreign direct
investment following the cessation of sanctions.
29It is assumed that Turkish projected demand would be 20% lower than in the reference scenario.
30Please see for instance: “Rough Seas Ahead for the Turkish Economy” In: Stratfor, 01.11.2016. Avail-
able at: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/rough-seas-ahead-turkish-economy
(Access date: 07.11.2016).
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transits would at least contribute a positive effect to the natural gas supply diversity
of South Eastern European countries which are highly dependent upon Russian gas.
Moreover, from various scenarios analysed the one assuming an oligopolistic mar-
ket structure and stronger than expected demand in Europe would have the greatest
impact in elevating the amount of gas flowing through Turkey to European conti-
nent. The results of this scenario suggest that by 2030 the amount of gas that could
be re-exported from Turkey to European markets would reach 37.5 bcm, constituting
6.8% of total European demand. However, the assumptions made in this scenario
are quite unlikely ever to be realised given the current conditions in global and Eu-
ropean gas markets. The second scenario that creates a major deviation from the
reference scenario features lower than expected Turkish gas demand growth due to
a possible weakening of the Turkish economy. Accordingly, total re-exports would
be 26.7 bcm, which is slightly higher than the reference scenario by 2030.
One of the most important outcomes of this chapter according to our simulation
model is that Turkey’s importance as a future European natural gas transit coun-
try would be rather limited and highly dependent on several internal and external
factors such as the behaviour of Russia together with future Turkish and European
demand. Out of these factors, European demand and the ability of major suppli-
ers of Europe, particularly Russia, to exert market power are the most significant.
Turkey’s role may be stronger if European gas demand is higher than expected and
Russia exerts greater market power. From a European perspective these conditions
would not be preferable as they would lead to higher gas prices and a corresponding
worsening in general welfare levels.
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4. Natural Gas Transits and Market Power – The
Case of Turkey
Turkey is a key country in order to realize the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) due
to its geographical location. However, as the main transit country within the SGC,
Turkey could potentially exert market power with gas transits. Whether Turkey ex-
erts market power or not, is crucial for an economic assessment of the SGC. Hence,
the article investigates this issue quantitatively using a global partial equilibrium gas
market model. An oligopolistic and a competitive supply structure in the European
upstream market in 2030 are considered in the model based on calibrations to his-
torical gas market situations. If the European gas market in 2030 is characterized
by an oligopolistic supply, Turkey is able to exert market power resulting in higher
prices compared to competitive transits, in particular in South Eastern Europe. In
a competitive market structure, however, the importance of the SGC and thus the
potential of Turkish transit market power is limited.
4.1. Introduction
The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) consists of planned pipeline projects that connect
the natural gas producers in the Caspian region and the Middle East (Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraq and Israel) with the natural gas markets of the European
Union (EU). The EU promotes the SGC for two reasons: (1) it would like to diversify
its natural gas supplies and (2) it aims to close its growing supply gap that arises
due to decreasing indigenous production. Turkey has a key role in realizing the
SGC, since Turkey’s geographical location is between the producing countries and
the EU. This crucial role of Turkey is widely discussed in the literature.1 Compared
to Ukraine, which is a single-source transit country for Russian gas only, Turkey
has the potential to become a multi-source transit country fed by several suppliers
from the Caspian region and the Middle East or Russia. The goal of the Turkish
1See for instance Berk et al. (2017), Tagliapietra (2014a), Tagliapietra (2014b), Winrow (2013),
Wigen (2012) or Lise et al. (2008)
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government, however, is not only to aim for a pure transit role for Turkey, i.e. allow
upstream producers the access to the Turkish transmission network and to the EU
downstream market, but rather to use its multi-source advantage for actively trading
in the natural gas markets, as is outlined in Skalamera (2016):
“Turkey, however, bargained hard against a straightforward transit role,
intending instead to take over the role of a hub, which means that it
would buy gas arriving at its borders, consume what it needs, and sell
on the balance at profit.”
However, this perception is far away from the economic definition of an energy
hub.2 In economic terms, the Turkish perception means that Turkey wishes to use its
geographical location to exercise market power in the European natural gas market
(transit market power). If the natural gas producers have market power themselves,
Turkey’s plans would give rise to double marginalization (Tirole, 1988). This per-
spective is missing within the current discussion about the SGC although it could
potentially eliminate the economic benefits of the entire project.
Hence, the research objective of this chapter is to investigate possible implications
of Turkey’s strategic behavior for the EU natural gas markets and for the economic
feasibility of the SGC project. The global natural gas market model COLUMBUS
(Hecking and Panke, 2012) is extended and applied in order to simulate strategic
behavior of transit countries like Turkey.3 In a simulation for the year 2030, a case
with Turkish market power is compared to competitive Turkish transits, i.e. a sce-
nario in which upstream producers have to pay only transportation costs to ship
gas through Turkey to European markets. Besides varying the Turkish behavior, dif-
ferent market structures in the European upstream market are considered, i.e. an
oligopolistic upstream market and a competitive upstream market, in order to derive
a comprehensive understanding of Turkey’s role in the SGC.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: In Section 4.2, a review of literature
that is is relevant for the analysis is given. A stylized theoretical model to discuss
2Heather (2015), for instance, identifies five important requirements for an energy hub: a high level
of (1) liquidity, (2) volatility and (3) anonymity as well as (4) market transparency and (5) traded
volumes. Furthermore, a physical hub is a location where several pipelines coming from and going
to different directions converge and enable physical trade and competition. The Turkish perception
of becoming a hub rarely fulfills those requirements. For a deeper discussion of this topic see also
Berk et al. (2017).
3In reality, besides buying gas volumes upstream and reselling them downstream, a transit country
could exert market power by inducing high transit fees or imposing taxes for gas transits on its
territory. Those measures would result in a mark-up increasing the price of gas deliveries through
the transit country and hence have a similar effect for the final customers as a policy of the transit
country to explicitly buy and resell gas.
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the problem of Turkish transits is developed in Section 4.3. Subsequently, in Section
4.4, the global natural gas market model COLUMBUS and its inputs are described.
Afterwards, the model calibration is discussed. Based on the calibration, Section 4.5
focuses on the model results and discusses the implications of Turkish transit market
power for the EU. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2. Literature Review
There are four different streams of literature to which this work is related to: (a)
literature about gas market modeling based on non-cooperative game theory, (b)
literature about natural gas transits, (c) publications about Turkey’s energy relations,
and (d) literature focusing on double marginalization.
The first literature stream is based on simulation models that are programmed
as mixed complementarity problems (MCP). As the COLUMBUS model that is used
within this work, MCPs allow the simulation of market behaviour and thus to con-
sider different forms of competition on different stages of the value chain. An early
study is provided by Boots et al. (2004) in which gas producers are represented
as oligopolists in a static model called GASTALE. The model considers downstream
traders that act either oligopolistically or competitively. The study shows that succes-
sive oligopolies in gas markets lead to high prices - similar to the case of successive
oligopolies in the SGC in this chapter. Later on, a dynamic version of GASTALE is
developed by Lise and Hobbs (2009) that consider the SGC producers Azerbaijan,
Iran and Iraq as potential suppliers for Europe. A further early work is Gabriel et al.
(2005a). It also considers the natural gas supply chain as a MCP in which the traders
marketing gas of the producers had market power. Several existence and uniqueness
results are provided as well as illustrative numerical results. Gabriel et al. (2005b)
considers more in-depth numerical simulation of a version of this model for the North
American natural gas market. In a later contribution by Holz et al. (2008), a static
model named GASMOD is applied to analyze the European gas markets with regard
to their market structure. Using data of 2003 they analyze different combinations of
competition in upstream and downstream markets and come to the conclusion that
Cournot competition in both markets (double marginalization) is the most accurate
representation to model the European gas market. In Section 4.4.3, a similar cali-
bration exercise is done for the years 2014 and 2016. In later research, Holz (2009)
extends the static GASMOD model into a dynamic version.
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Within the stream of literature that focuses on gas transits, Yegorov and Wirl
(2010) analyze games that appear in the context of gas transits. They distinguish be-
tween games with a transit country as a net gas exporter (such as the case of Turkem
gas transits through Russia) and with a transit country as a net gas importer (such
as Turkey). They conclude that the game structure arising from a transit problem
is not absolute but depends on geography and international law. Furthermore, von
Hirschhausen et al. (2005) analyze Ukrainian market power for Russian gas exports
to Central Europe. They focus on the effects of an alternative Russian export route
to Central Europe, the Yamal pipeline via Belarus and how cooperation between
Ukraine and Russia could have made the investment into the Yamal pipeline un-
necessary. Dieckhöner (2012) analyzes Ukrainian transits from a security of supply
perspective discussing potential diversification options for Europe like the Nabucco
pipeline. Later, Chyong and Hobbs (2014) introduce a strategic European natural
gas market model to analyze a gas transit country. They apply their model to inves-
tigate the case of the South Stream gas pipeline. The question of Ukrainian transit
market power is hereby important for the profitability of this offshore pipeline. Tran-
sit market power is represented by a conjectured transit demand curve approach.
However, the conjectural variations of the transit country are chosen as a calibra-
tion parameter and vary between 0 and 1. This approach is common in natural gas
market modeling but also often criticized, e.g. by Perry (1982), Dockner (1992)
and Smeers (2008). Within the literature about transit problems, there are further
cooperative game theory approaches: Hubert and Ikonnikova (2004), Hubert and
Suleymanova (2008), and Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011), for instance, analyze mar-
ket power of transit countries within the Eurasian supply chain. Furthermore, they
examine strategic investments into alternative infrastructure projects to bypass the
transit countries and reduce their market power. However, the above-mentioned
works focus all on Ukraine, a single source transit country fed by Russian gas only.
In the chapter at hand, the potential multi-source transit country Turkey that would
not be dependent on a single dominant exporter is in the focus of investigation.
Within the literature about Turkey’s energy relations, there are geopolitical and
economic contributions. Cagaptay (2013) discusses geopolitical factors associated
with different potential gas suppliers for Turkey. Skalamera (2016) finds that there
are many obstacles for Turkey to become a gas hub. Furthermore, Berk and Schulte
(2017) show that Turkey’s potential to become an important transit country for the
European natural gas market is strongly restricted. Moreover, they quantify different
drivers that could increase Turkish transit volumes and therefore its importance as
a transit country.
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Apart from a specific gas market context, there are works that discuss options to
avoid double marginalization. Joskow (2010) analyses different factors that impact
the decision of companies to either rely on markets to source supplies or to inte-
grate vertically. Double marginalization would be a neoclassical factor favoring ver-
tical integration. In the context of this chapter, competitive access for upstream gas
producers to the Turkish transmission grid would lead to the same shipment quan-
tities through Turkey that vertically integrated companies, i.e. upstream producers
owning pipelines through Turkey, would choose. Besides the neoclassical double
marginalization approach, which focuses on the implications of market power for
market efficiency, Joskow (2010) also mentions Transaction Cost Economics (TCE),
which focuses on the implications of market power for firms’ efficiency. According
to TCE, firms could rely on different contractual relations that minimize other firms’
bargaining power, e.g. vertical integration, joint ventures, long-term contracts. The
conditions of those contractual relations depend on the degree of asset specific in-
vestments required for a given market and the extent to which firms are locked-into
already binding contractual relations. In the context of this chapter, which has a
market efficiency perspective, contractual relations could avoid a double marginal-
ization structure and transfer a part of the upstream producers’ rent to Turkey or
European consumers. Therefore, it is important to note that the simulated configura-
tions (competitive transits and double marginalization) are two extreme outcomes,
and bargaining about the rents could also lead to a solution in between.
The value added to the literature of this analysis is two-fold. Firstly, it consid-
ers the specific case of Turkey and quantitatively examines its potential to exercise
transit market power in the EU gas market. Secondly, a double marginalization ap-
proach (successive oligopolies) is used to describe a multi-source transit country like
Turkey.4
4.3. Stylized Theoretical Model
Tirole (1988) describes double marginalization in the most basic setting, the suc-
cession of two monopolies in a vertical integrated value chain. In this section, an
extended version of this textbook model is introduced to describe a market structure
with a multi-source transit country potentially giving rise to double marginalization
4In contrast to Chyong and Hobbs (2014), the conjectural variation of a transit country takes on either
the value of the Cournot conjecture or the competitive conjecture. Thus, the critique of arbitrary
conjectural variations is not relevant for this analysis.
51
4. Natural Gas Transits and Market Power – The Case of Turkey
and suppliers that are not dependent on the transit country. Therefore, a setup with
4 players, 3 producers and the multi-source transit country, is considered in order to
obtain insights into the functioning of transit market power. It is assumed that the
transit country and the producers are not vertically integrated. Producer 1 can sell
volumes q1 directly to the final market representing a value chain without double
marginalization. Producer 2 (respectively producer 3) is dependent on the transit
country and thus can only sell volumes q2 (respectively q3) to the transit country
that then resells the volumes qT = q2 + q3 to the final market. Figure 4.1 illustrates
the stylized model. The assumption that all the volumes entering the transit coun-
try are resold corresponds to the assumption that no domestic market of the transit
country needs to be served (in the absence of indigenous production of the transit
country).
Figure 4.1.: Illustration of the stylized model
The final market has a price PF and a total supply Q = q1+qT . The inverse demand
function of the final market is assumed to be linear with an intercept α and a slope
β:
PF (Q) = α− βQ
The profit-maximization problem of producer 1 with her marginal cost C1 is given
by:
max(ΠP1) with ΠP1 = (PF (Q)− C1) · q1 subject to q1 ≥ 0 (4.1)
52
4.3. Stylized Theoretical Model
The corresponding first-order conditions with a conjectural variation r1 =
∂ qT
∂ q1
,
which takes on the value of 0 for Cournot behavior and -1 for competitive behavior
of the producer, are:
C1 − PF + β · (1+ r1) · q1 ≥ 0⊥ q1 ≥ 0 (4.2)
Producer 2 (respectively producer 3) produces gas at marginal cost C2 (respec-
tively C3) and sells it to the transit country at the price PE . The problems of the
producers 2 and 3 are given by:
max(ΠPi) with ΠPi = (PE(qi)− Ci) · qi subject to qi ≥ 0 for i = 2, 3 (4.3)
The corresponding first-order conditions are:
Ci − PE − ∂ PE
∂ qi
· qi ≥ 0⊥ qi ≥ 0 for i = 2, 3 (4.4)
The inverse demand function PE(qT ) is found by considering the transit country’s
profit maximizing problem and its first-order conditions with the conjectural varia-
tion rT =
∂ q1
∂ qT
. The transit country’s profit is determined by the difference between
the price of the final market PF (Q) and the price for which the transit country can
buy volumes from the upstream producer PE:
max(ΠTR) with ΠTR = (PF (Q)− PE) · qT subject to qT ≥ 0 (4.5)
The first-order conditions are given by:
PE −α+ βq1 + βqT + β · (1+ rT ) · qT ≥ 0⊥ qT ≥ 0 (4.6)
If rT has the value -1, transits are modeled as competitive, whereas the value of 0
corresponds to a situation in which the transit country exerts market power (Cournot
conjecture). If qT > 0 is fulfilled, the equation (4.6) can be rewritten as:
PE = α− βq1 − βqT · (2+ rT ) (4.7)
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With qT = q2 + q3, this can be plugged into equation (4.4). With r2 =
∂ q3
∂ q2
and
r3 =
∂ q2
∂ q3
, this yields:
Ci − PE + β · (1+ ri) · (2+ rT ) · qi ≥ 0⊥ qi ≥ 0 for i = 2,3 (4.8)
Equations (4.2) and (4.8) define the mixed complementarity problem for the styl-
ized model. The important insight is that the inverse transit demand function can be
included in the first-order conditions of producer 2 and producer 3. Turkey’s inverse
transit demand function is implemented in the global gas market model COLUMBUS
accordingly as described in detail in appendix C.
4.4. Methodology: The Global Gas Market Model
COLUMBUS
4.4.1. Model Description & Overview
In order to analyze the double marginalization induced by a multi-source tran-
sit country within a more complex market, the global natural gas market model
COLUMBUS (cf. Hecking and Panke (2012), Growitsch et al. (2014), Hecking et al.
(2016), Berk and Schulte (2017) as well as Berk et al. (2017)) is extended and ap-
plied. It is an intertemporal partial equilibrium model. Formulated as an MCP, it
is able to account for strategic behavior of the upstream sector. Inputs are assump-
tions about production capacities, demand and gas infrastructure. COLUMBUS is a
dynamic model which means that demand for investment into gas production and
infrastructure are determined endogenously based on exogenously given economic
factors such as investment costs and discount rates.
In its standard version, the COLUMBUS model is only able to consider strategic be-
havior of the vertical integrated suppliers defined "as a trading unit associated with
one or more production regions" (Hecking and Panke, 2012). Transit countries, as
in the focus of this chapter, are not associated with their own production region but
can buy gas at their border from the neighboring countries. Therefore, the model
is extended by introducing transit countries such as Turkey as profit-optimizing ex-
porters. Technical details of the model extensions as well as a detailed technical
description of the existing standard version of the COLUMBUS model can be found
in appendix C.
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The COLUMBUS model is calibrated with the data described in Section 4.4.2. Two
calibrations with different conjectural variations are considered, one calibration to
the year 2014 and one calibration to the year 2016. Both years are relevant because
we aim on having calibrated configurations for an oligopolistic and a competitive
upstream sector. As shown in Section 4.4.3, the European gas market of 2014 fits
better to an oligopolistic setup, whereas the European gas market of 2016 fits better
to the competitive assumption.
4.4.2. Input Data and Assumptions
Market Characteristics
In line with political and regulatory targets of the EU5 (ACER, 2015b), further in-
tegration of the natural gas markets until 2030 is assumed. The EU market is ag-
gregated into two clusters of countries: (1) a Northern & Western European (NWE)
market and (2) a South Eastern European (SEE) market. The respective countries of
each cluster are shown in Figure 4.2. The SEE market consists of the Balkan penin-
sula and Italy. Italy will be connected to the SGC by the TAP pipeline that is planned
to become operational in 2018. The NWE market is composed of the remaining EU
countries. The countries of each cluster are assumed to form an integrated market.
Integration means that only one entry tariff (respectively exit tariff) has to be paid
in order to ship gas into (respectively out of) the integrated market area.6 A pre-
requisite for such a market design are investments in pipeline connections between
the countries of the market area to reduce the risk of structural congestion.7 An
integrated market implies that there is only one gas price within each market area.
While the NWE market is already today characterized by a high degree of market
integration in terms of sufficient infrastructure, competitive hub pricing and a high
number of supply sources, the SEE market currently lacks connecting infrastructure
and is dominated by Russian gas supply and oil-indexed long-term contracts (ACER,
2015a). However, there are various infrastructure projects (e.g. the CESEC initia-
5Within this chapter the EU includes the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway and all states of
former Yugoslavia.
6Uniform entry/exit tariffs are assumed that are calculated as a capacity weighted average of histor-
ical tariffs from the ACER market monitoring reports (ACER (2014) and ACER (2016)). Basing
the analysis on historical tariffs implies that the costs of further investments into the natural gas
infrastructure would be regained at the exit points to the customers. For an interesting discussion
of how to derive entry/exit fees in an integrated European market cf. Hecking (2015).
7Persistent congestion within a market area would lead to high redispatch costs that would have to
be distributed to the gas customers within the market area.
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Figure 4.2.: Definition of the two clusters NWE & SEE
tive8) and regulatory incentives (e.g. agreements between the European Commis-
sion and Gazprom about destination clauses and pricing issues in LTCs9 that aim on
increasing the market integration within the SEE region. Hence, the assumption of
an integrated market in SEE in 2030 is in line with the EU’s long-term energy strat-
egy. The modeling of two segments of the EU gas market allows a differentiation of
effects of imports via the SGC on the NWE and SEE markets.
Demand
The model is based on linear demand functions as in Lise et al. (2008). Inputs for
each demand region are a reference demand, reference price and point elasticity
of demand.10 The fundamental data source for the historical reference demand
is the Natural Gas Information 2017 (IEA, 2017b). The future development of the
reference demand is based on the projections of the Medium Term Gas Market Report
2015 (IEA, 2015a) and the New Policies Scenario of the World Energy Outlook 2015
(WEO) (IEA, 2015b). Hence, a nearly constant demand development in the EU is
considered in this analysis. The point elasticities of demand are chosen in line with
Growitsch et al. (2014) and Egging et al. (2010). Thus, for instance, for Europe a
8https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure/
central-and-south-eastern-europe-gas-connectivity
9http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-555_en.htm
10The general level of the demand is an input to the model as the reference demand. However, given
the fact that the model is an equilibrium model, the equilibrium demand is an output of the model
and can deviate marginally from the input demand path.
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price elasticity of -0.25 is assumed. The European reference price is based on the
Title Transfer Facility (TTF) price for the history, whereas the future development of
reference prices is in line with (IEA, 2015b).
Production
The indigenous production of the EU is modeled exogenously, i.e. the respective
EU reference demand is reduced by indigenous production. However, all external
natural gas suppliers relevant for the EU such as Norway, Russia, suppliers from
North Africa, but also potential suppliers from the SGC as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan,
Iran, Iraq and Israel as well as global players that are able to supply LNG to the EU,
are modeled endogenously. The input data about production capacities, operational
and capital costs is based on a comprehensive literature research of current and
historic upstream projects. Data has been obtained from Seeliger (2006), Aguilera
et al. (2009), Hecking et al. (2016), publications of the Oxford Institute for Energy
Studies, current press notifications about new field discoveries / developments, and
by exchange with industry experts.
Infrastructure
The COLUMBUS model encompasses the major elements of the global gas infras-
tructure including pipelines and LNG terminals. Some projects that have reached
the financial investment decision (FID) status are exogenously given to the model
(e.g. LNG terminals in the USA and Australia). The data for the existing pipeline in-
frastructure in Europe is based on the capacity map and the Ten Year Network Devel-
opment Plan (TYNDP) of the European Network of Transmission System Operators
for Gas (ENTSOG, 2015). In Turkey, the existing pipeline connections from Russia
(Blue Stream), Georgia (Southern Gas Pipeline) and Iran (Tabriz-Ankara Pipeline)
are modeled. In addition, the first stage of the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP)
and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) are considered in the model with commission-
ing in 2018 and 2020. Information regarding LNG liquefaction and regasification
capacities has been gathered from publications of Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE)
(GIE, 2015) and from the LNG Industry Report 2015 which is published by the Inter-
national Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (GIIGNL, 2016). Facts about gas
storage originate from reports of Gas Storage Europe (GIE, 2015) and the Natural
Gas Information 2017 (IEA, 2017b).
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Besides investment costs, short-run marginal transport costs are relevant for the
market equilibrium. As already mentioned in Section 4.4.2, for the two consid-
ered European market areas, uniform capacity weighted entry/exit tariffs based on
ACER (2014) for 2014 and on ACER (2016) for 2016 and 2030 are used.11 The
Ukrainian entry/exit tariffs are from Interfax (2015).12 Transport costs for the SGC,
for the South Caspian Pipeline (SCP), for the TANAP and for the TAP are based on
a detailed analysis by Pirani (2016). A distance-based approach is applied to derive
transport costs for other non-European world regions for which no detailed cost data
is available.
The analysis is based on a pure economic rationale. This means that if not ex-
plicitly stated no political constraints are considered. Such constraints could be for
example limited pipeline investment options between countries hostile to each other,
or limited production capacities in countries that are politically unstable. While we
know that political factors should be taken into account for a comprehensive anal-
ysis of Turkey’s role in the SGC, we think that the economic perspective is helpful
to understand drivers of all relevant stakeholders in gas markets including political
actors.13 Furthermore, the model does not consider discrete investment choices.
Therefore, the simulation may also identify small capacity demands for investment
into infrastructure that would not take place in reality.
4.4.3. Model Calibration
The calibration results are shown in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4. Figure 4.3 illus-
trates modeled and historical EU natural gas supply by source in 2014 and 2016.
The respective bar in the middle depicts historical data from IEA (2017b). The
left bar illustrates the COLUMBUS simulation results if the upstream sector behaves
oligopolistically, and the right bar is the result for competitive behavior. For 2014,
it becomes clear, that the oligopolistic case matches history better than the results
with the competitive assumption. In the competitive case, about 5% more gas would
have reached the EU gas markets compared to the historical imports. According to
the model results, especially Russia withheld gas volumes in 2014. In 2016, there is
11Due to the fact that we consider only two market regions within Europe changes of Entry/Exit tariffs
have a minor impact only.
12The assumed Ukrainian tariffs from 2015 imply that the Ukrainian route is the most expensive Rus-
sian export option to Europe. So despite not modeling the Ukrainian market power with respect
to transit volumes endogenously, the Ukrainian market power is reflected in the exogenous tariff
assumption.
13Additionally, there is literature that imposes similar restraints with respect to political factors, e.g.
Berk and Schulte (2017).
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an opposing picture. Figure 4.3 shows that the simulation of competitive behavior
of the upstream producers matches reality better than oligopolistic behavior. In a
market with oligopolisitc behavior, 6% less gas would have been consumed in 2016
compared to the actual consumption. However, when comparing both behaviors, it
becomes clear that Russia was able to deter additional LNG imports by offering its
gas at more competitive prices.
Furthermore, Figure 4.4 shows the historical average European import natural gas
prices of 2014 and 2016.14 It depicts also the price results of the COLUMBUS simu-
lation, differentiated for the NWE and the SEE market as well as for an oligopolistic
and a competitive upstream behavior for each respective year. Again, it can be seen
that in 2014 the simulation of oligopolistic suppliers fits the reality best. For 2016,
historic prices match better with a simulation of competitive suppliers.
Figure 4.3.: Comparison of historical imports and model results in 2014 and 2016
However, it is hard to predict today if the upstream producers will behave oligopolis-
tically or competitively in 2030. Therefore, both potential developments are consid-
ered in the following analysis.
14Average import border price as reported by the World Bank. Applied exchange rate: 1.32 EUR/USD
(2014), 1.10 EUR/USD (2016)
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Figure 4.4.: Comparison of historical prices and model results in 2014 and 2016
4.5. Simulation Results
4.5.1. Turkish Transit Market Power in an oligopolistic European gas
market
In order to analyze the effects of Turkish transit market power in an oligopolistic EU
gas market (based on the conjectural variations for the model calibration to 2014),
two different scenarios are investigated: (1) a scenario with competitive Turkish
transits, i.e. the SGC upstream producers15 can access the Turkish transmission sys-
tem and have to pay only the transport costs, and (2) a scenario with Turkish transit
market power, i.e. the SGC upstream producers have no own access to the Turk-
ish transmission system and need to sell the volumes to an Turkish exporter (for an
overview of all considered scenarios in this analysis cf. Table C.2 in Appendix C.3).16
Initially, a scenario with competitive Turkish transits is considered. The left bar of
Figure 4.5 illustrates the simulated EU supply mix with competitive Turkish transits
in 2030. Due to exhausting resources, the EU natural gas production declines from
125 bcm in 2016 to 98 bcm in 2030. For similar reasons, Norwegian imports are
diminished from 115 bcm in 2016 to 65 bcm in 2030. In addition, Russian imports
decrease from 149 bcm in 2016 to 112 bcm in 2030 in the oligopolistic scenario due
15SGC producers are potential suppliers from the Caspian region as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan or
from the Middle East as Iran, Iraq and Israel, that are also assumed to act strategically. Hence, they
potentially withhold quantities to generate higher prices.
16In Appendix C.4.1, a sensitivity analysis on the conjectural variation of Turkey with values between
-1 (competitive) and 0 (Cournot behavior) is considered.
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to the withholding of quantities. The LNG market, which is assumed to be competi-
tive, partly fills the resulting supply gap. Another part is filled by imports from the
SGC via Turkey. On this route 45 bcm reach the EU market in 2030. Assuming that
10 bcm/a of SGC capacity is already financed in the TAP project and will be realized,
this means that an additional pipeline capacity investment into the SGC of 35 bcm/a
would be economically viable according to the model results. Obviously, Turkey and
the SGC producers could benefit from an oligopolistic EU market situation with high
prices in 2030. Hence, the share of EU’s gas consumption that arrives via the SGC
could be about 9%.
Figure 4.5.: EU supply mix per source in dependence on Turkish behavior in 2030
Besides the scenario with competitive transits, a scenario in which Turkey acts as
a Cournot player, buying gas from the neighboring SGC producers and reselling it to
the EU with a profit margin, is considered (a behavior called Turkish transit market
power in the following).17 The SGC producers are assumed to have pipeline access to
the EU market via Turkey only. Because the SGC producers are modeled as Cournot
players as well, this implies successive oligopolies with double marginalization as
described in Section 4.3.18 Pipeline investments on Russian territory by non-Russian
17In terms of the theoretical model described in Section 4.3 this means Turkey has a conjectural vari-
ation of 0.
18Russian transits through Turkey are still assumed to be competitive. Russian volumes are not bought
by the Turkish Cournot player but can be sold to the European markets through Turkey directly
by the Russian exporter that pays competitive transit fees. Turkey is not in the position to force
Russia into a double marginalization structure as long as Russia has alternative channels to supply
the European markets. Russia’s direct investment options to Europe are not restricted and Russia
rather prefers such direct routes to the EU as Nord Stream 2 due to lower costs compared to the
Turkish transit option.
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actors are thereby excluded. The assumption that SGC producers are not able to
deliver gas via Russia to the EU is relaxed in Appendix C.4.2. The simulation results
of the scenario when Turkey exerts market power are shown in the right bar of Figure
4.5. If Turkey exerts market power, Turkish re-exports would be much lower than
in the competitive case at 13 bcm/a or additionally to the TAP capacity 3 bcm/a
in 2030. For the EU this would mean higher gas prices and thus a slightly lower
demand (-10 bcm/a). However, most of the gas that would originally be imported
via Turkey could be replaced by higher LNG imports (+10 bcm/a) as well as higher
direct imports from Russia (+7 bcm/a).
The effect of Turkish transit market power on the EU gas market prices in 2030
is shown in Figure 4.6.19 The figure again compares a situation with (left bar) and
without (right bar) the exertion of Turkish transit market power. Additionally, due
to the differentiation of the EU markets into a NWE and a SEE market, regional
prices in Europe can be analyzed. In the competitive scenario, prices are lower in
SEE than in NWE in 2030. This is opposed to today’s situation in which prices in
South Eastern Europe are the highest on the continent. As already illustrated in
Figure 4.4 in Section 4.4.3, the calibration results also show higher prices in SEE
in 2014 and 2016 than in NWE. This can be explained with the fewer number of
exporters that offer gas in the SEE market compared to NWE. If the SGC producers
enter the market as new suppliers via Turkey, competition increases and leads to
lower prices. However, if Turkey would exert market power, the positive effect of
further market entries diminishes resulting again in higher prices in SEE. It can be
observed that by the exertion of Turkish transit market power prices in NWE would
be 4.3% higher, while prices in SEE would be 6.9% higher than in a situation with a
competitively behaving Turkey. This points out that in an oligopolistic European gas
market structure the strategic behavior of Turkey would have a significant economic
impact, in particular on the SEE market.
Figure 4.7 shows the implication of Turkish transit market power on the profits of
Turkey, Russia and the SGC producers. Additionally, the figure points out the impact
on the EU consumer surplus. It shows the differences in profits and consumer surplus
between a competitively acting Turkey and when Turkey exerts transit market power.
In the competitive case, the Turkish profits are by definition 0. Thus, if Turkey exerts
market power, it earns profits of 1.8 billion EUR in 2030. Due to less SGC gas within
the EU gas markets, more Russian gas is exported to the EU in the transit market
power case which leads to higher Russian profits of 2.5 billion EUR. However, profits
19Prices are in real terms based on EUR 2014.
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Figure 4.6.: Natural gas prices in dependence on Turkish behavior in 2030
of the SGC producers are 13.1 billion EUR lower in 2030. The EU suffers a loss of
consumer surplus by 6.6 billion EUR.20
The results discussed so far have focused on transits of the SGC producers via
Turkey to the EU. However, it is also important to look at the domestic Turkish gas
market. Within this chapter it is assumed that Turkey would not exert market power
in its domestic market. This is in line with a policy of the Turkish government to
aim on low domestic gas prices that support economic growth. Thus, the domestic
market can be directly supplied by all connected exporters. In the scenario with
competitive Turkish transits, Turkey’s modeled gas demand grows to 63 bcm in 2030
from 46 bcm in 2016. If Turkey exerts transit market power, its domestic demand
is expected to amount to 65 bcm in 2030 according to the model results. In the
market power case, the SGC producers have an incentive to ship gas to the Turkish
domestic market instead of using the expensive transit option to the EU. Hence, the
20Summing up the differences of all rents shown in Figure 4.7, Turkish market power leads to a net
welfare loss of 15.4 billion EUR compared to a scenario with competitive Turkish transits given an
oligopolistic upstream market. This welfare loss could be avoided by contractual relations. In a
setup with market power by Turkey, especially long term contracts with minimum take-or-pay obli-
gations between European importers and the SGC producers could lead to fixed volumes flowing
through the SGC. Additionally, a transit contract with Turkey could be signed. Another possible
contractual relation would be a joint-venture of the SGC producers, Turkish transmission operators
and European importers. Besides neoclassical approaches, future research could consider transac-
tion cost based theories for a comprehensive analysis of the most suitable contractual relations in
the SGC.
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Figure 4.7.: Development of profits and consumer surplus if Turkey exerts market power in
2030
competition in the Turkish domestic market increases leading to 5% lower gas prices
and hence to 1.1 billion EUR additional Turkish consumer surplus compared to the
case with competitive Turkish transits. Thus, Turkey benefits twice by exertion of
transit market power: (1) by profits from transits and (2) by a higher consumer
surplus in its domestic market.
Figure 4.8 shows the origin of the gas exports of Turkey to the EU in 2030. It
compares the transits for both considered scenarios (with and without the exertion of
Turkish transit market power). If Turkey behaves competitively, about two thirds or
30 bcm of Turkish transits to the EU is Azerbaijani gas from the Shah Deniz field in the
Caspian Sea. Since no Iranian sanctions are considered (pure economic rationale),
an additional 11 bcm of Iranian gas would reach the EU market via Turkey in 2030.
This figure seems to be quite small compared to the fact that Iran has the world’s
largest natural gas reserves (BP, 2016). Nevertheless, according to the model results,
Iran supplies other markets than the EU such as Pakistan, India or the global LNG
market.21 Furthermore, about 4 bcm of expensive Israeli off-shore gas from the
Mediterranean Sea would reach the EU. Turkmenistan and Iraq would not transit
gas via Turkey to the EU due to comparably low price signals and the far distance.
They would only supply the Turkish domestic market (both would deliver about 7
bcm). Whereas Turkmenistan would supply gas to Asian customers, the exports from
21For a more detailed discussion about Iranian exports see Berk and Schulte (2017).
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Iraq are limited due to the increasing indigenous demand (mainly gas demand from
the crude oil production).
On the contrary, if Turkey exerts market power, nearly all of the 13 bcm gas tran-
sits that would reach the EU would be from Azerbaijan. The reason lies in the
country’s missing alternative demand sinks and thus the strong Azerbaijani depen-
dence on Turkey compared to Iran that can ship gas to the above mentioned al-
ternative markets. Gas from Israel, however, would be too expensive and not ex-
ploited. Again, Turkmenistan and Iraq would deliver the Turkish domestic market
only (Turkmenistan: 12 bcm, Iraq: 10 bcm). Besides that, Turkmenistan would fo-
cus on non-European markets. Against this background, Appendix C.4.2 considers
a sensitivity analysis in which Azerbaijan can ship gas through Russian territory to
the EU. In such a setup, market power would earn Turkey profits in the range of of
0.4-0.5 billion EUR instead of 1.8 billion EUR in the case without Russian transits.
Figure 4.8.: Turkish gas transits into the EU per source in dependence on Turkish behavior
in 2030
65
4. Natural Gas Transits and Market Power – The Case of Turkey
4.5.2. Impact of Turkish Transit Market Power in a competitive
European gas market
In the next step, the effects of Turkish transit market power in a competitive EU
market is investigated. Hereto, we use the same conjectural variations as for the
model calibration for 2016 (cf. Section 4.4.3). However, as already shown by Berk
and Schulte (2017)22, the chance of Turkey to become an important transit country
for the EU is quite limited under competitive market conditions. There is only a
minor demand for expensive gas from the SGC in a competitive EU gas market setting
with a nearly constant future gas demand development. Similar results are found in
this chapter.
If Turkey behaves competitively and SGC producers have to pay only the current
TANAP transit fees, 23 bcm of gas would pass through Turkey to the EU in 2030.
Nearly 18 bcm would come from Azerbaijan and approximately 5 bcm form Iran.
Gas from Israel would be too expensive to reach the EU markets. However, even in
this situation Turkey would be able to exert transit market power. Hereby it would
earn profits of 0.5 billion EUR. Nonetheless, if Turkey would exert market power in
such a competitive environment, the potential of the SGC project to diversify the EU
gas markets is negligibly small. Approximately 5 bcm from Azerbaijan would reach
the EU gas markets. That means that even the capacity of the already financed first
stage of the SGC would be oversized. That underlines the minor importance of the
SGC under competitive market conditions.
4.6. Conclusion
The results of the chapter illustrate that Turkey has the potential to exert market
power in the EU natural gas markets if an oligopolistic market structure (similar to
the historical gas market in 2014) is assumed. If Turkey behaves competitively in
this market environment, 45 bcm of Turkish transit volumes would arrive in Europe
in 2030 according to the model outcome. In such a situation, gas prices in the SEE
region could be lower than in the NWE region because the SGC producers would
increase the competition, in particular in the SEE region. In the case of Turkish
transit market power, however, the transits through Turkey would be reduced to
13 bcm in 2030, illustrating a big potential to withhold quantities from the markets.
22A further study that investigates the role of the SGC under competitive market conditions is Hecking
et al. (2016).
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According to the model outcome, gas prices in the NWE region would be 4.3% higher
in this setting in 2030 compared to a situation with competitive Turkish transits.
However, SEE would be most significantly affected by 5.9% higher prices if Turkey
exercises market power. The consumer surplus of the EU would be 6.6 billion EUR
lower compared to the case in which Turkey behaves competitively. If Turkey would
only withhold quantities to the European markets and not to its domestic market,
lower gas prices in Turkey would be the consequence. Hence, Turkey could increase
its consumer surplus (by 1.1 billion EUR) besides earning profits from transits (1.8
billion EUR) making it attractive for Turkey to use the market power option.
However, in a competitive future gas market setting (similar to the historical gas
market in 2016), gas imports via Turkey and the SGC would be only of minor im-
portance, even if Turkey behaves competitively. Hence, also the Turkish potential of
pursuing transit market power is limited.
Our analysis illustrates that the economic raison d’être for the SGC is only given for
an EU gas market that is characterized by oligopolistic natural gas suppliers. How-
ever, in this oligopolistic environment, Turkey could benefit from exerting market
power and hereby eliminate the potential benefits of the SGC for the EU. As a pol-
icy implication, the EU could prefer direct connections between supply and demand
avoiding new dependencies on transit countries. Other potential policy measures
would be the harmonization of Turkey’s energy laws with EU directives that guar-
antee a non-discriminative access to transmission grids, and policies incentivizing
contractual relations between the SGC producers, Turkey and European importers.
Additionally, the EU as well as the SGC countries could make concessions in other
sectors of the economy if Turkey allows competitive transits given that low or no
tariffs to access foreign markets can be negotiated with exchange deals in the same
or other sectors of the economy.
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5. Diversification at any price? – The European
Union’s diversification ambitions for natural
gas
The launch of the European Commissions Third Energy Package in 2009 was the
founding of the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators - ACER. The Agency’s
overall mission is to complement and coordinate the work of the national energy
regulators and the completion of a single EU energy market. In doing so, the Agency
evaluates the level of diversification for natural gas of each EU member state. To this
end, ACER applies several metrics that require a predefined score, e.g., a Herfindahl-
Hirschman-Index (HHI) of at most 2000.
Within this work, the effects of compliance of ACER’s diversification scores is ana-
lyzed, in particular for the HHI. In a first step the relevant market defined by ACER to
calculate the HHI is questioned. Secondly, a realization of ACER’s predefined score
for the HHI is simulated for the year 2025. In order to do so, the natural gas mar-
ket model COLUMBUS is extended and applied. The simulation results show that a
realization of the metric scores is possible. However, the fulfillment would largely
impact gas flows as well as have strong economic implications. On the one hand, it
would replace natural gas flows from eastern Europe (e.g. the Russian Federation)
to western Europe (e.g. LNG imports). Hence, Russia would have to reduce its gas
supply by around one third in 2025. On the other hand, due to the ban on low-cost
Russian gas, the diversification would result in higher European natural gas prices
and hence a loss in consumer surplus of 13 billion Euro.
5.1. Introduction
In 1998, the European Commission published its First Gas Directive (98/30/EC),
which focused on the liberalization of the EU natural gas markets and the develop-
ment of one internal EU market. Five years later in 2003, the Second Gas Directive
(2003/55/EC) was published. It included for the first time an article on "Monitoring
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of Security of Supply" (Article 5), which assigned the national regulation authorities
(NRA) responsibility. In 2009, as part of the Third Energy Package, the Commis-
sion launched the Third Gas Directive (2009/73/EC) focusing on a further enhance-
ment of the internal market. With regard to natural gas, the package included two
new regulations: one on the conditions for the access to natural gas transmission
networks (EC No 715/2009) and one on the establishment of the Agency for Co-
operation of Energy Regulators (ACER) (EC No 713/2009). The European agency
established by the latter regulation was meant to encourage better cooperation of
the NRAs as well as facilitate the implementation of the single EU energy market.
Two years later in 2011, ACER published the Gas Target Model (GTM), a struc-
tural framework with the vision of "a competitive, secure European gas market that
benefits all consumers" (ACER, 2015b)1. To reach this vision, ACER focuses on the
development of a ’well-functioning’2 internal wholesale market for natural gas and
defined several criteria with a certain score that should be fulfilled, e.g., to measure
the level of diversification3. Furthermore, ACER was to monitor the functioning of
gas markets and report to the European Parliament and the Commission (Article
11). By publishing an annual monitoring report, the agency should identify compe-
tition barriers of the internal market for natural gas and suggest possible solutions.
In its recent monitoring reports, ACER criticizes the low diversification and hence
the vulnerability of the European gas markets against the exertion of market power
(ACER, 2017a).
The overall objective of this paper is to investigate ACER’s diversification metric –
the HHI – and analyze what a realization of the defined score would imply for the EU
gas market in terms of its natural gas supply mix as well as the economic conditions.
Beside the literature on EU regulations, the research is related to two further
streams of literature that address the mentioned research questions: (1) literature
that focuses on diversification and (2) literature on numerical natural gas market
models that can be used to simulate the degree of diversification of a future EU gas
market. With respect to the first stream of literature, Stirling (1998) provides a com-
prehensive overview on different approaches to evaluate diversity in economics in
general. With a view on natural gas markets, diversity or the diversification of sup-
ply sources often go hand in hand with the discussion on either security of supply or
1The GTM was reviewed and updated in 2015 (ACER, 2015b).
2Joskow (2006) defines a ’well-functioning’ wholesale market as a market in which either suppliers
offer their product at marginal (opportunity) costs such that the last increment of supply is setting
the price or prices exceed marginal costs at limited number of times in which supply capacity is
constrained.
3The GTM is discussed in more detail in the next section.
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market concentration as an indication for market power. The literature that focuses
on diversification to address security of natural gas supply issues had its heyday par-
ticularly in the course of the two Russia-Ukrainian gas conflicts in 2006 and 20094.
However, since then, the EU addressed several measures to avoid security issues
such as the launch of regulations5 and the financing of PCI6 infrastructure projects.
In addition, the Nord Stream pipeline was commissioned in 2012, which made Rus-
sia but also the EU more independent from gas transits via Ukraine. As a positive
result, today’s gas markets are less vulnerable against potential supply disruptions,
as shown by several studies (Hecking, 2015, Hecking et al., 2016, Martinez et al.,
2015).7
However, in the last few years, diversification has been used more in the context
of ensuring a well-functioning market or well-diversified supply, which will result in
a more competitive EU price formation (ACER, 2017a). Hence, the focus lies more
on the competitiveness of gas markets and market concentration in general, instead
of supply security. As mentioned before, this also holds true for ACER, which ap-
plies, e.g., the HHI on historical data to evaluate if a market is well-functioning. The
application of diversity indices is well-established in economics. Hence, indices like
the HHI are often applied as (inverse) indicators for competition intensity and mar-
ket efficiency (Bester, 2012). For example, based on Cowling and Waterson (1976),
Bester (2012) shows for companies within one industry that the competition inten-
sity of a Cournot market is inversely proportional to market concentration or the
ratio of the HHI and demand elasticity. The Federal Trade Commission of the U.S.
Department of Justice or by the European Commission also apply an HHI to evalu-
ate antitrust concerns of horizontal mergers (European Commission, 2004, Federal
Trade Commission, 2010). However, there is no causal relationship between market
concentration and the market efficiency, and Cowling and Waterson (1976) show
the relationship only for the case when all companies considered have the same
marginal costs. Market shares depend on factors such as a company’s cost structure
and the type of competition. Hence, a reduction in production costs that may in-
crease a company’s market share and therefore the market concentration may have
indeed a positive effect on welfare (Bester, 2012). Also Demsetz (1973) and Peltz-
4See, for instance, Bettzüge and Lochner (2009), Cohen et al. (2011), Le Coq and Paltseva (2009,
2012), Månsson et al. (2014).
5Regulation (EC) No. 2017/1938(European Commission, 2017) or Regulation (EC) No. 994/2010
(European Commission, 2010).
6EU Projects of Common Interest.
7For a more comprehensive overview of security of supply indices found in the literature, see also
Schulte (2014), Sovacool (2012), Sovacool and Mukherjee (2011).
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man (1977) argue that a high market concentration may indeed be a signal of a high
market efficiency.
The modeling of natural gas markets allows the scenario simulation and analysis
of possible future developments, e.g., a fulfillment of ACER’s diversification scores.
Therefore, the second stream of literature that is of interest for this work is liter-
ature on natural gas market models8. A first important model in this context is
the GASTALE model, developed by the Energy Research Center in the Netherlands
(ECN) (Boots et al., 2003). It is a partial equilibrium model formulated as a mixed
complementarity problem (MCP) and is able to simulate market behavior of differ-
ent agents. In addition, a later version of the model is able to endogenously identify
demand for investment (Lise et al., 2008, van Oostvoorn and Lise, 2007). How-
ever, GASTALE is limited in its spatial resolution: It models the European market
with only two demand and five supply regions, which would make an analysis on
a EU member state level impossible. In comparison, the TIGER model has a much
higher granularity. The TIGER model of the Institute of Energy Economics (EWI) at
the University of Cologne was developed by Lochner (2011c) and applied in several
studies9. TIGER is a linear optimization model which stands out with its high spatial
resolution. Among others, it involves all European underground gas storages and
LNG import terminals and has at least one demand region per country. However,
in its standard version, TIGER does not model investment endogenously, which is
important for an efficient analysis of supply diversification. Beside the aforemen-
tioned limitations for the analysis at hand, both of the models described focus on
the European gas market only. Global interdependence, e.g., the LNG market, is
only considered in a simplified way as an exogenous parameter10. The COLUMBUS
model described, extended and applied in Section 5.3 addresses the shortcomings
of the mentioned models.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 provides an
overview of ACER’s Gas Target Model and challenges its diversification metric, the
HHI. Subsequently in Section 5.3, the COLUMBUS model is extended and applied
to simulate the gas market situation in 2025 with and without an achievement of
ACER’s predefined score for the HHI. Hereby, it is possible to analyze the implica-
8The gas market models mentioned are only a selection of the variety of models that are available
in the literature. For a more comprehensive overview, please see Schulte (2014) and Schulte and
Weiser (2019a).
9See, e.g., Dieckhöner (2012), Dieckhöner et al. (2013), Lochner (2011a,b), Lochner and Bothe
(2007), Lochner and Dieckhöner (2011, 2012), Lochner and Richter (2010).
10In a new version of the TIGER model, it is possible to include LNG supply functions derived by the
COLUMBUS model, see Hecking and Weiser (2017).
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tions of ACER’s diversification targets on the EU gas markets. Finally, Section 5.4
concludes.
5.2. ACER’s Gas Target Model
5.2.1. ACER’s diversification metric
In its GTM, ACER defines how a ’well-functioning’ gas market can be realized. One
main pillar of the model comprises entry-exit zones with virtual trading points and
market integration, which should be served by an appropriate level of infrastruc-
ture that enables the gas to move freely between market areas. In this context, the
interconnections and the implementation of the Network Codes, as described in Reg-
ulation No 715/2009 (European Commission, 2009b), also play a key role. In order
to assess whether or not the wholesale market is well-functioning, ACER’s GTM pro-
vides a series of criteria or metrics that are applied on a member-state level in a
yearly monitoring report. The metrics are evaluated according to an optimal score
that should be achieved and can be pooled into two categories, according to their
market characteristics: (1) market participants’ needs metrics and (2) market health
metrics. While the former should indicate how liquid a market is, the latter should
indicate if the markets are structurally competitive, resilient and have a sufficient
degree of diversity of supply.
For the analysis at hand, the focus lies on the aspects of upstream competition and
diversity of supply. Hence, particularly the Herfindahl Hirschmann Index (HHI), one
of the health metrics, is in the center of the discussion. The HHI measures supply
side market concentration and is defined as follows:
HHI =
n∑
i=1
(ai · 100)2 (5.1)
While i is the individual supplier, n is the number of suppliers and ai the individual
suppliers market share. According to ACER, the HHI of a considered market should
be lower or equal to 2,000. Note that requiring HHI to be lower or equal than 2,000
implies that there need to be at least five suppliers in a market.11
11Note that a further health metric requirement of ACER is that the number of supply sources is at
least 3. Hence, if ACER’s requrement for the HHI is reached, the requirement for the number of
supply sources is reached, too.
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5.2.2. The definition of the relevant market
In its annual monitoring report, ACER evaluates the health metrics and hence the
HHI on a member state level. Hence ACER implicitly defines the member state as
the relevant market. By doing so, ACER neglects the EU internal gas market whose
intention are free gas flows between the member states realtive to price signals. In
particular, in western Europe, gas markets have been physically well interconnected
for a long time. Hence, gas flows between the nations are easily possible, if neces-
sary. But also most of the eastern gas markets have developed very well in terms
of market integration in recent years, with new pipelines and compressor stations
became operational. The new infrastructure allows reverse gas flows from the liquid
western European gas hubs to the eastern markets. Hence, by applying the HHI on
historic supply shares, ACER undermines the existing supply capacity of the coun-
tries, which may allow imports from alternative supply sources.
Also Peters (2018) argues that the application of the HHI on a national level is
in general questionable. Due to well working natural gas hubs, particularly in the
Northwest-European traded markets, it becomes hard to track the origin of gas sup-
ply after it has entered the market. In ,e.g., the Dutch hub Title Transfer Facility
(TTF) gas has several options to enter the market: via the Dutch LNG terminal Gate,
via pipeline from Norway, the United Kingdom (UK), Germany or from domestic pro-
duction. However, since the gas has already entered the market, molecules become
anonymous and a tracking of volumes is hardly possible.
Hence, the discussion about the relevant market and its integration is closely re-
lated to the discussion of the presence of outside options. If markets are well inter-
connected and have an access to alternative supply sources, the high market con-
centration induced by a single supplier is only of minor importance. Lithuania, e.g.,
was, until 2014, an isolated market that was fully dependent on Russian gas supplies.
This allowed Russia to enforce higher prices compared to other countries. However,
after building an LNG terminal in 2014, Lithuania’s bargaining power against Rus-
sia changed, resulting in lower gas prices (Schulte and Weiser, 2019a). Today the
Russian market share in Lithuania is more than 80%, such that a HHI would be at
least 6400 (IEA, 2018a). However, due to the presence of additional capacity in the
form of a LNG terminal, Russia is not able to enforce higher prices. The same can
be observed on a EU level. As already shown by Hecking et al. (2016), the Euro-
pean gas market has several options to diversify its natural gas supply. However,
LNG imports in particular could be increased if suppliers with high market shares
try to exert market power. Hence, the globally-determined LNG price would set a
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maximum price ceiling to the European market that would come into force if prices
reach the level of the LNG price.
In the future, it is likely that the internal EU gas market will further progress and
become even more integrated, as addressed by the EU Directive 2009/73/EC (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2009a). The internal market will continue to promote free gas
flows between all EU member states such that gas will only follow price signals. To
enable this development, further financial support for physical connections between
the member states, e.g., a stronger support for the EU projects of common inter-
est (PCI) is important and should be provided by the EU. In addition, ACER’s gas
market integration and connection tools (e.g., market merger), as suggested in the
GTM (ACER, 2015b), may promote further integration. However, an implementa-
tion of these integration tools does not mean that ACER will fulfill its self-defined
HHI thresholds, which are calculated on a member state level. A better connection
of the markets and further physical infrastructure between the member states should
be interpreted as an insurance, allowing for alternative gas imports if a market is not
functioning well due to supply disruptions or the exertion of market power.
5.3. Market Concentration in the Future EU Gas Market - A
Model-Based Analysis
5.3.1. Methodology - The COLUMBUS Model
Model description and extensions
To analyze the economic effect of an achievement of ACER’s predifined score for
the HHI, the global gas market model COLUMBUS was extended and applied. The
model was initially developed by Hecking and Panke (2012) and used to address
several gas market-related research questions12. COLUMBUS is a spatial and inter-
temporal equilibrium model. Formulated as a MCP, the model allows the simulation
of the market behavior of different actors. The model has a high spatial resolution
(e.g., 21 modeled regions for the EU13). This allows diversification to be analyzed
for most of the member states. Assumptions on gas infrastructure, production ca-
12See, for instance, Growitsch et al. (2014), Hecking et al. (2016), Berk and Schulte (2017), Berk
et al. (2017) or Schulte and Weiser (2019b).
13All large gas-dependent member states are included. The Baltic States are modeled as one region
as well as the nations of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Malta and Cyprus are
not considered; Luxembourg is aggregated with Belgium.
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pacities and demand are based on public data and are inputs in the model. Based
on economic factors such as investment and production costs or discount rates, the
model identifies demand for investment endogenously. This model characteristic
is crucial for the analysis at hand because, in some countries, investment will be
necessary to diversify supply. Furthermore, COLUMBUS also considers the global
interdependence of the LNG market and its impact on Europe. Because LNG plays
a crucial role for the diversification of the European gas markets, this is a further
advantage to help answer the research questions. A detailed technical description
of the COLUMBUS model is provided in Appendix D.
ACER’s HHI benchmark was implemented in the COLUMBUS model as a maxi-
mum import constraint14. This results in a limitation of the market share for large
natural gas suppliers in general and especially for the Russian Federation. A detailed
technical description of the model extension is provided in appendix D.2. The HHI
is calculated ex post, based on the simulated gas flows and the respective company
shares of a country15. However, due to the fact that for the main supply countries
such as the Russian Federation the major national gas companies have a monopoly
on (pipeline) exports, an ex-post calculation leads to the same results. Subsequently
to the ex-post calculation of the HHI, the import constraints of each country and sup-
plier are adjusted and the model is re-simulated in an iterative process until a HHI
of at most 2000 is reached. The company shares of the modeled supply countries
are assumed to be constant over the horizon simulated.
Data Input
Spatial equilibrium models like COLUMBUS are based on a large number of funda-
mental data such as demand, supply and infrastructure that are fed into the model.
Based on the approach of Lise et al. (2008), the COLUMBUS model relies on lin-
ear demand functions. The reference natural gas demand is an exogenous input to
the model but, due to price elastic functions, the resulting demand is sensitive to
the price. Demand is derived on a country level for the sectors household, industry
and power. Point elasticities of sector and country-specific demand are in line with
Growitsch et al. (2014) and Egging et al. (2010). The reference demand data is
based on Natural Gas Information (NGI) 2017 (IEA, 2017b) for historical values as
14A direct implementation of the HHI constraint would be the first-best option. However, due to the
quadratic character of the HHI, the implementation in numerical simulation problems is limited.
15In COLUMBUS countries are modeled, not companies. The company shares are based on desk re-
search and are shown in Table D.1 in Appendix D.3.
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well as on the Market Report Series Gas (GAS) 2017 (IEA, 2017a) and the New Poli-
cies Scenario of the World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2017 (IEA, 2017c) for the future
projections. As a consequence, a nearly stable demand development is assumed for
Europe.
While production of net importers is modeled exogenously, production of net ex-
porters is modeled endogenously. The underlying data is based on a comprehensive
literature analysis of historical and current upstream project developments. Among
others, data was sourced by Hecking et al. (2016), Aguilera et al. (2009) and Seel-
iger (2006) as well as publications by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Fur-
thermore, long-term contracts (LTC) between different countries are an important
characteristic of the supply side and also considered in COLUMBUS. LTC data is
based, among others, on Neumann et al. (2015).
Given its importance for the natural gas market, COLUMBUS includes a large data
set for infrastructure including pipelines, LNG liquefaction and regasification termi-
nals as well as storage facilities. The data on existing and planned infrastructure
capacities16 is an input to the model and is based on different sources such as the
map’s of European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG)
and Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) (ENTSOG, 2017, Gas Infrastructure Europe,
2017, GIE, 2018), the LNG Industry Report 2017 (GIIGNL, 2017), different IEA
publications (IEA, 2017a,b,c) and the Ten Year Network Development Plan 2018
(ENTSOG, 2017). Future demand for infrastructure without financial investment
decision (FID), however, is identified endogenously based on different parameters
such as, e.g., investment costs or future price developments.
Calibration
The model is calibrated and back-tested for the year 2016. In line with Schulte and
Weiser (2019b), a competitive market environment is assumed. Figure 5.1 shows the
calibration results regarding the HHI for 2016. The HHI reported by ACER (ACER,
2017a) is plotted on the horizontal axis. The EU member states17 are represented by
16Only projects with the status financial investment decision are given exogenously to the model (e.g.,
LNG projects in the USA or Australia).
17The islands Malta and Cyprus are not modeled in COLUMBUS due to their missing connection to the
European gas network system. The Baltic States are modeled as one node, hence it is not possible
to calculate an individual HHI for each country. The same applies for Croatia and Slovenia, which
are modeled within a region that represents all countries of the former Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. Luxembourg is modeled together with Belgium; however, due to the small size of
their markets, the impact on the total European costs is comparably low.
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the bubbles. The size of the bubble indicates the market size, i.e., the member states’
annual gas consumption. In 2016, only four member states (namely the United
Kingdom, Sweden, Belgium and France) reached ACER’s requirement and had a HHI
below 2000. However, most of the EU members have not achieved the requirement.
Figure 5.1.: HHI comparison: ACER vs. COLUMBUS simulation results
The vertical axis of Figure 5.1 shows the calibration results of the COLUMBUS
model for 2016. The closer the member states’ HHI is to the red bisectrix, the better
the COLUMBUS results reflect ACER’s calculations. It is obvious that, in general, the
COLUMBUS results fit ACER’s historical values quite well. However, not all historical
values are met. In particular, this results from the lack of data that ACER provides
for the calculation of its HHI18. The values for the HHI calculation for the study at
hand are based on the gas imports simulated with the COLUMBUS model and the
respective company market shares that were derived by an own data research. The
largest deviation is shown for Slovakia, which imported in reality natural gas from
the German spot market despite the fact that its LTC with Russia is higher than its
demand19.
18According to ACER (2017b), the market shares of the upstream companies to the supply sources
were assigned based on desktop research, which is not published by ACER.
19This specific situation is not covered by the COLUMBUS model.
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5.3.2. Scenarios & Results
Scenario definition
In order to analyze the economic impact of the implementation of ACER’s diversi-
fication ambitions – the achievement of the predefined HHI score – two different
scenarios are analyzed: (1) a Reference Scenario and (2) an ACER Target Scenario.
The Reference Scenario assumes ’business-as-usual’ conditions and forecasts the de-
velopment of the future natural gas market under the assumption of current market
policies and economics. In the ACER Target Scenario, however, the score for the
HHI intended by ACER need to be achieved in the future. More specifically, this
means that each EU member state should have a HHI of at most 2000. Thereby, the
focus year for the model simulation is 2025, which is the year ACER addresses in
its “A Bridge to 2025” conclusion paper (ACER, 2014). A comparison of both sce-
narios draws conclusions about the general impacts and the economic effects of an
achievement of ACER’s diversification ambitions.
The Reference Scenario
The Reference Scenario simulates the European natural gas market under business-
as-usual conditions up to the year 2025. Hence, there is no requirement regarding
diversification, and only economics decide where the member states receive their
gas imports from. The resulting HHI for the member states considered is shown
in Figure 5.2. While the horizontal axis shows the COLUMBUS simulation results
for 2025, the vertical axis depicts the results for 2016. For 2025, it is obvious that
only a few EU member states would fulfill ACER’s HHI requirement of lower than
2000, namely the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Greece. While the former two
countries already achieve ACER’s HHI requirement today due to their distance to
the Russian Federation and a well-fitted LNG import infrastructure, the latter two
countries would achieve the HHI requirement and hence a reduction of market con-
centration, in particular, by the import of contracted gas volumes from Azerbaijan20.
The EU member states can be separated into two clusters: western states (blue),
which are generally better diversified, and eastern states (orange), which show a
higher market concentration due to a higher share of Russian gas. Only two of the
20Italy has a LTC with Azerbaijan of 8 bcm annual contracted quantity (ACQ) and Greece of 1 bcm.
The take or pay (TOP) amount of both LTCs is assumed to be 70%. This 70% would enter the
market despite the comparably high costs of gas that is imported via the Southern Gas Corridor
(see also Berk and Schulte (2017), Schulte and Weiser (2019b)).
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Figure 5.2.: Scenario 1: COLUMBUS simulation results for HHI
eastern European member states reach a HHI that is lower than 3000: Greece, as
already mentioned, and Bulgaria. Bulgaria would benefit from its new intercon-
nection to Greece via the so-called ’Gas Interconnectror Greece Bulgaria’ (IGB) but
also from imports via the Southern Gas Corridor21 (SGC). The remaining eastern
states perform much worse in terms of the HHI. Due to its geographical distance,
the Russian Federation would have a large share of the eastern countries’ natural
gas supply. Finland would be fully supplied with Russian gas. Russian gas would
be also dominant in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, which show a HHI of more
than 9000. Furthermore, Poland, Hungary and Romania would record a HHI of
more than 5000. While in Poland and Hungary Russian gas would play a major role,
Romania would be mainly supplied by companies that exploit domestic resources.
Among the western states, there are big markets such as Italy, France and Spain,
that improve their market concentration in 2025 compared to today. In particular,
these are countries with access to the global LNG market. However, other large mar-
kets such as Germany and the Netherlands would perform worse in terms of their
HHI. While the domestic Dutch production further declines, there is more space for
Russian gas imports. Nord Stream 2, an expansion of the current direct pipeline
connection between the Russian Federation and Germany, supports the supply of
21Bulgaria has a LTC with Azerbaijan with an ACQ of 1 bcm/a.
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Russian natural gas to both markets22. The model identifies the investment into the
pipeline based on economic fundamentals23. Due to the sufficient physical connec-
tion of the German and the Dutch market, low-cost Russian re-exports via Germany
are the preferred Dutch option. Hence, LNG plays only a minor role in that market.
A look at the EU level shows a different picture regarding market concentration.
When considering the EU as one integrated market and aggregating the member
states’ supply mix, a HHI of 1640 would be reached for 2016. Hence, considering
the EU gas supply as shown in Figure 5.3, ACER’s requirements would already be
achieved today, compared to a calculation on a national level as shown in Figure
5.1, despite the fact that the Russian Federation or Gazprom has a market share
of 31%. The reason for the comparable low HHI on an aggregated European level
is twofold: First, the indigenous EU production in particular has a much more di-
versified company structure. Second, the aggregated LNG supply, with its different
origins and companies involved, is heterogeneous. When looking at 2025, the EU
supply mix changes dramatically. However, the overall heterogeneity remain on a
constant level. Due to exhausted resources, the EU indigenous gas production de-
clines. The same applies for Norway and, thus, its exports to the EU. As a result, the
EU would become more dependent on imports from outside Europe. The resulting
supply gap would be partly filled with additional gas from the Russian Federation.
Due to a slightly increasing gas demand in the EU in 2025, the Russian market share
would remain stable at 31%. Furthermore, a minor amount of natural gas (11 bcm
in 2025) would be imported via the SGC from Azerbaijan. Finally, LNG would be
the main source of gas that would replace the declining European production. The
LNG import in the EU would increase from a market share of 9% in 2016 to 20% in
2025. The more heterogeneous imports, particularly evoked by additional LNG sup-
ply, increase the diversity of natural gas supply on an aggregated EU level. Hence, in
2025, the HHI of an integrated EU natural gas market would be at 1430 even lower
than today’ value.
The supply mix in Figure 5.3 can be sufficiently realized with the existing, planned
and already financed (FID) EU natural gas infrastructure. Only some additional in-
vestment is identified within the EU24: (1) a pipeline in the Balkan region that allows
the import of gas that arrives in Turkey via Turk Stream, (2) a pipeline that connects
the Baltic States and Poland and (3) a pipeline that distributes the additional vol-
22However, also without Nord Stream 2 the Russian market share and thus the HHI of both countries
would increase, as shown in a sensitivity in which Nord Stream 2 is prohibited in Appendix D.4.
23For more details on the economics of Nord Stream 2, see Hecking et al. (2016).
24COLUMBUS identifies demand for investment on a cross border or inter-connector level. It does not
consider bottlenecks within a country.
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Figure 5.3.: EU gas supply mix in the Reference Scenario
umes of Russian gas that is supplied via Nord Stream 2 to Germany25. However,
outside the EU, the model identifies a demand for the two large Russian pipeline
projects: Turk Stream and Nord Stream 2. The demand for investment in the two
Russian export pipelines is driven by the economic rationale to bypass Ukraine and
avoid high transit fees, which are assumed to stay at the current level26. There
results show no need for additional LNG facilities. While the western states bene-
fit from their sufficient LNG infrastructure and imports from overseas, the eastern
states benefit from their close distance to the Russian Federation and the supply via
pipeline.
The ACER Target Scenario
In the ACER Target Scenario, an achievement of ACER’s HHI score is mandatory
by 2025. In order for this to be possible, Russian LTCs for at least some of the EU
member states27 need to be relaxed, as their continued enforcement up to 2025 and
beyond would make a reduction of the HHI below 2000 impossible. After the relax-
ation of the LTCs, all countries considered (i.e., the western as well as the eastern
states) fulfill the HHI of max. 2000.
25The so-called EUGAL pipeline that partly distributes the gas supplied via Nord Stream 2.
26For a more detailed analysis on the Ukrainian transit tariffs as well as the rationale for Nord Stream
2 at lower tariffs can be seen Hecking et al. (2016).
27These include the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria and Germany.
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The satisfaction of the HHI threshold changes the entire European supply mix
significantly compared to the Reference Scenario, mainly due to the detriment of
Russian gas supply volumes. As shown in Figure 5.4, the Russian supply would be
reduced to 97 bcm in 2025, 55 bcm less than in the Reference Scenario. While the
domestic European gas supply from the EU member states as well as from Norway
remain more or less stable, the LNG supply would increase by 43 bcm to 138 bcm.
Due to its high supply costs, natural gas imports via the SGC from Azerbaijan would
increase only slightly.
Figure 5.4.: Scenario comparison of EU gas supply mix in 2025
On a member state level, it becomes clear that there would be a dramatic change
in gas flows. A strong drop in Russian gas supply from the east would be replaced
by a surge of LNG supply predominantly imported in western Europe. The declin-
ing gas production of the Dutch Groningen gas field would also be compensated
by higher LNG imports. In comparison to the Reference Scenario, the Netherlands
would become a net re-exporter to Germany in the ACER Target Scenario. The same
applies for Belgium and Poland, who would both re-export LNG to Germany. Hence,
Germany would strongly reduce its share of Russian gas, making Nord Stream 2 su-
perfluous. As a result, the role of Germany as a European transit country would be
lower – with 44 bcm instead of 70 bcm re-exports – in 2025. However, gas tran-
sits from Russia would be partly replaced by gas transits from Germany’s western
border to eastern and southern European countries. This would enable the diversi-
fication of the eastern European markets. Furthermore, markets with access to the
sea, such as Poland or the Baltics, would increase their LNG imports. The same ap-
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plies for Greece and Italy. These two countries, together with Bulgaria, would also
have slightly higher imports via the SGC. Hence, even when the high cost imports via
the SGC are limited in volume, they would contribute in terms of diversification to
some EU member states such as, in particular, the smaller gas markets in the Balkan
region.
Figure 5.5.: Scenario comparison of EU gas prices
While the impact of ACER’s diversification targets on demand for additional invest-
ment is only minor, its general impact on prices and consumer surplus is relevant.
Figure 5.5 shows the effects of the realization of the ACER targets on natural gas
prices. The implementation of the HHI threshold on a member-state level would
lead to a price increase of the EU average consumption weighted gas price of 12%
compared to a scenario without any diversification constraint. In terms of consumer
surplus, this means a loss of 13 billion Euro within the EU in 2025. In particular,
eastern member states that are closely located to Russia and already dependent on
Russian supply today would suffer from higher natural gas prices. While prices in
eastern European countries would increase by an average of 17.5%, prices in west-
ern European countries would rise by around 10.9%. Hence, the main driver for
higher prices and the resulting loss of consumer surplus is not the additional de-
mand for infrastructure but rather the replacement of lower-cost Russian gas supply
with other sources, in particular LNG.
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5.4. Conclusion & Further Research
The chapter analyzed ACER’s diversification metric, the Herfindahl Hirschmann In-
dex (HHI) and its impact on the EU natural gas market. First, ACER’s definition
of the relevant market, which is crucial for the interpretation of the concentration
index HHI, is qualitatively discussed based on existing literature. ACER defines the
relevant market on a national basis; however, it is argued that the definition is not
sufficient because it neglects both the internal EU gas market as well as the pres-
ence of outside options. When assuming the internal EU gas market as the relevant
market, the HHI score of at max 2000 would already be reached today. Second, a
realization the HHI, as defined by ACER, was analyzed with a quantitative simula-
tion model. The focus of the analysis is on the year 2025. Within two scenarios, it
was shown that the adherence of the maximum HHI is theoretically possible on a
national level. However, the simulation results show that the reduction of the HHI
below 2000 on a member state level and the associated diversification would have
a strong implication on gas flows as well as on the economics within the EU. On
the one hand, eastern natural gas flows, e.g, from the Russian Federation would be
replaced by western natural gas flows, e.g., from LNG imports. As a consequence,
Russia would have to reduce its gas supply by around one third by 2025. On the
other hand, due to the ban on low-cost Russian gas, the diversification would result
in higher European natural gas prices and hence a loss in consumer surplus of 13
billion Euro. Due to the dependence of, in particular, eastern European states on Rus-
sian gas, prices and consumer surplus of these states would suffer more (+17.5%)
compared to western European states (+10.9%).
Albeit the analysis has clearly identified the shortcomings of ACER’s definiton of
the HHI and how it is applied to monitor whether the EU natural gas market is
well-functioning, there are namely two aspects identified that could be addressed
by further research: First, although ACER’s definition of the relevant market un-
derrates the progress of the internal EU gas market, the application of the HHI on
the entire EU may overrate the current level of gas market integration. In a subse-
quent analysis, the EU market could be separated into regional clusters of already
well-integrated EU member states. The clusters would represent the relevant market
that could be evaluated by concentration indices like the HHI. Second, the analysis
focussed on ACER’s health metric HHI only. Further research could focus on the RSI
as the main indicator to monitor if the EU gas market is well functioning.
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Notwithstanding the above mentioned further research, a recommendation of this
analysis is that the EU should further focus on the development of its internal gas
market and evaluate diversification on a more comprehensive level than of a national
one. If the EU gas markets would be further integrated, gas could flow more freely
between the member states. As such, an outside option would be made available
for each member state, which would allow for supply from its neighboring market
in the event a supplier would try to exert market power.
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A. Supplementary Material for Chapter 2
A.1. Welfare Implications of a Quota
Proposition A.1. The imposition of a strictly positive quota L > 0 does not increase
the total welfare.
Proof. A quota would not increase the welfare if ∂W∂ L |L=0 ≤ 0 holds. Therefore, we
consider the first order condition of welfare optimization:
∂W
∂ L
=

1+
∂ q∗D
∂ L

p
 
q∗D + L
− C ′D  q∗D · ∂ q∗D∂ L − C ′F (L) . (A.1)
This yields:
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L=0
= p
 
q∗D

+

p
 
q∗D
− C ′D  q∗D · ∂ q∗D∂ L − C ′F (0) . (A.2)
The second term is zero or negative because:
•  p  q∗D− C ′D  q∗D≥ 0 due to the profit optimization of the dominant supplier
(she would not bid below marginal costs)
• ∂ q∗D∂ L < 0 (cf. proof for Proposition 2.1 )
Therefore, it follows:
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∂ L

L=0
≤ p  q∗D− C ′F (0) . (A.3)
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, it holds true that the welfare does not increase:
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Please note that the welfare strictly decreases for C
′
F (0)> p
 
q∗D

.
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B. Supplementary Material for Chapter 3
B.1. Model description
The COLUMBUS model applied in the paper allows for analysing inefficiencies, which
might arise due to strategic behaviour of market players. The model code is derived
using the maximisation problem of the different players (i.e. producers, exporters,
regasifiers, etc.) in the global gas market. COLUMBUS optimises under the assump-
tion of perfect competition the future development of production, transport and
storage capacities as well as the dispatch of gas flows around the world. The model
uses an inelastic demand and a piecewise-linear supply function representing con-
sumption and production. Furthermore it can be extended to include a simulation of
strategic behaviour of different players (e.g. producers) and analyse market power
on the demand side, too.
The following model description is based on Hecking and Panke (2012). COLUM-
BUS is a spatial model consisting of vertices and edges. Vertices can be either sources
(production facilities) or sinks (demand). Pipelines and LNG shipping routes are
connected with edges. Table B.1 gives an overview of all sets, parameters and vari-
ables in the model.
Notation: Sets, Variables and Parameters
Table B.1.: Sets, Dual Variables, Parameters
1. Sets
n, n1 ∈ N all model nodes
c ∈ C cost levels (steps of piecewise linear supply function)
t ∈ T months
y ∈ Y years
p ∈ P ∈ N producer / production regions
e ∈ E ∈ N exporter / trader
d ∈ D ∈ N final customer / demand regions
r ∈ R ∈ N regasifiers
l ∈ L ∈ N liquefiers
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Table B.1.: Sets, Dual Variables, Parameters
s ∈ S ∈ N storage
2. Primal Variables
prp,c,t produced gas volumes
f le,n,n1,t physical gas flows
t re,d,t traded gas volumes
sts,t gas stock in storage
sis,t injected gas volumes in stroage
sds,t depleted gas volumes from storage
drp,c,y depleted resources
ipp,c,y annual investment into production capacity
i tn,n1,y annual investment into pipeline transport capacity
iss,y annual investment into storage capacity
ilng y annual investment into LNG transport capacity
irr,y annual investment into regasification capacity
ill,y annual investment into liquefaction capacity
mdoe,d,t minimal delivery obligation
3. Dual Variables
λp,c,t marginal costs of physical gas supply by exporter e to node n
in time period t
σs,t (intertemporal) marginal costs of storage injection
αp,c,y marginal value of resources in node n at cost level c in year y
βd,t marginal costs / price in node n in time period t
µp,c,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of production capacity
φn,n1,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of pipeline capacity
εs,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of storage capacity
ψs,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of storage injection ca-
pacity
θs,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of storage depletion ca-
pacity
ιt marginal benefit of an additional unit of LNG transport capac-
ity
γr,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of regasification capac-
ity
ζl,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of liquefaction capacity
χe,d,t marginal costs of delivery obligation
4. Parameters
demd,t final customer’s demand for natural gas
capn,t/n,n1,t/n,c,t monthly infrastructure capacity
resn,c,y maximum resources
t rcn,n1,t transport costs
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Table B.1.: Sets, Dual Variables, Parameters
prcn,c,t production costs
opcn,t operating costs
incn,y/n,n1,y/n,c,y investment costs
distn,n1 distance between node n and node n1 in km
LNGcap initial LNG capacity
speed speed of LNG tankers in km/h
c fs conversion factor used for storage inj. and depl. capacity
el t economic life time of an asset
sloped,t slope of the linear demand function in node d
cve conjectural function of exporter e; market power level
The time structure of the model is defined by a set T ⊂ N of points in time (months)1,
which is flexible designed for adaption by a respective user. Any year (y) until 2040
can be simulated with up to twelve month per year.
In the following the optimisation problems of the different players modelled in
COLUMBUS as well as their corresponding first-order optimality conditions are out-
lined. The first-order conditions are combined with the market clearing conditions
in order to form the partial equilibrium model.
B.1.1. The Exporter’s Problem
First of all, exporters e ∈ E are defined as a trading unit associated with one or
more production regions p ∈ Pe. With respect to the assumed profit maximising
behavior, an exporter buys gas from the different production regions and sells the
gas (t re,d,t) on the wholesale markets of the demand nodes d ∈ D over the modelled
time period t ∈ T . The exporter’s payoff function is defined in equation B.1, where
λe,d,t corresponds to the exporter’s costs of physical gas delivery to demand node d
and βe,d,t is the market price at the demand node. Exporters may either act as price
takers or as potential executors of market power. If the exporter can exert market
power it observes the linear inverse demand function, otherwise it observes market
price directly. Conjectural variation parameter, cve, is used to express the exporters
1In the current paper, only annual results are represented for the sake of simplicity.
91
B. Supplementary Material for Chapter 3
those have market power.
max
t re,d,t
∏
eI
(t re,d,t)
=
∑
t∈T
∑
d∈D

(1− cve) · βe,d,t + cve · βe,d,t(
∑
e∈E
t re,d,t)−λe,d,t
 · t re,d,t ,
t re,d,t ≥ 0
(B.1)
Moreover, in case of a Long-term contract (LTC) between the exporter and the
improting region, the trade flows between them have a lower bound, i.e., a mini-
mal delivery obligation mdoe,d,t . The LTCs are taken in to account in the following
constraint. ∑
t∈T
t re,d,t −mdoe,d,t ≥ 0 ∀e, d, t (χe,d,t). (B.2)
However, in reality an exporter faces the problem of how to minimise transport
costs when selling natural gas on a wholesale market with physical delivery by choos-
ing the cost-minimising transport flows f le,n,n1,t . COLUMBUS modells this as a sep-
arate optimisation problem as shown in equation B.3, where opcn,t reflects the costs
of regasifying a unit of natural gas if n is a regasification node [r(n)], while t rcn,n1,t
is denoted as the short-run marginal LNG transport costs from node n to node n1.
max
f le,n,n1,t
∏
eq
( f le,n,n1,t) =
∑
t∈T
(λe,n1,t −λe,n,t − t rcn,n1,t − opcn,t) · f le,n,n1,t (B.3)
Further physical transport constraint within the optimisation problem are formu-
lated in equation B.4 (pipeline capacity), equation B.5 (liquefication capacity) and
equation B.6 (regasification capacity).
capn,n1,t +
∑
y∈Yt
i tn,n1,y −
∑
e∈E
f le,n,n1,t ≥ 0 ∀n, n1, t (φn,n1,t). (B.4)
capl,t +
∑
y∈Yt
ill,y −
∑
e∈E
∑
n∈N
f le,n,l,t ≥ 0 ∀l, t (ζl,t). (B.5)
capr,t +
∑
y∈Yt
irr,y −
∑
e∈E
∑
d∈D
f le,r,d,t ≥ 0 ∀r, t (γr,t). (B.6)
Additionally the limitation of available LNG transport capacity is defined with the
constraints of average speed in km/h(speed), distance between n and n1 as well as
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back in km and number of LNG tankers times their average size (LNGcap).
LNGcap +
∑
y∈Yt
ilng y

· 8760/12 · speed
−∑
e∈E
∑
l∈L
∑
r∈R
2 · ( f le,l,r,t · distn,n1)≥ 0 ∀t (ιt)
(B.7)
B.1.2. The Producer’s Problem
Next, every producer p ∈ P is assumed to operate a single production region, where
revenue is earned by selling gas from its production region to an exporter. The pro-
ducer’s payoff function
∏
p prp,c,t , ipp,c,y given below assumes that every producer
maximises her profit, while acting as a price taker in the market.
max
prp,c,t
ipp,c,y
∏
p
(prp,c,t , ipp,c,y) =
∑
t∈T
∑
c∈C
(λe,p,t + prc,p,t − prcc,p,t · prp,c,t)
+
∑
y∈Y
∑
c∈C
(incc,p,y · ipp,c,y)
(B.8)
The set of feasible solutions for prp,c,t is restricted to be non-negative, constrained
to a maximum production capacities equation B.9 and restricted by a resource con-
straint equation B.10, respectively reformulated as equation B.11:
capp,c,t +
∑
y∈Yt
ipp,c,y − prp,c,t ≥ 0 ∀p, c, t (µp,c,t) (B.9)
resp,c,y − drp,c,y ≥ 0 ∀p, c, y (αp,c,y). (B.10)
resp,c,y − drp,c,y−1 −
∑
t∈T (y)
prp,c,t ≥ 0 ∀p, c, y (αp,c,y). (B.11)
B.1.3. The Transmission System Operator’s Problem
A number of Transmission System Operators (TSO) are modelled as players in the
natural gas market which is subject to regulation (e.g. price). Because short-run
marginal transport costs t rcn,n1,t cancel out, the pay-off function of the TSOs (equa-
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tion B.12) is the result following constraint icluding the congestion rent (φn,n1,t).
max
i tn,n1,y
∏
TSO
(i tn,n1,y)
=
∑
t∈T

φn,n1,t · (capn,n1,t +
∑
y∈Yt
i tn,n1,y)

−∑
y∈Y
(incn,n1,y · i tn,n1,y).
(B.12)
B.1.4. The Liquefier’s Problem
Liquefiers l ∈ L receive natural gas from exporters e, liquefy it and use LNG tankers
to send the resulting LNG downstream to regasifiers r ∈ R. Thereby Liquefiers allo-
cate liquefaction capacities to the traders and receive in return the sum of short-run
variable liquefication costs opcl,t and the congestion rent ζl,t , which is determined
by the liquefication capacity restriction (equation B.5). The liquefiers maximise the
profit function as shown in equation B.13.
max
ill,y
∏
l
(ill,y) =
∑
t∈T

ζl,t · (capl,t +
∑
y∈Yt
ill,y)

−∑
y∈Y
(incl,y · i t l,y). (B.13)
B.1.5. The Regasifier’s Problem
Regasifiers r ∈ R receive LNG, regasify it and send the resulting natural gas to a
demand node by the TSO of the respective pipeline. The optimisation problem (here
Lr w.r.t. irr,y) is similar to the liquifier’s one, also if the congestion rent is now
denoted as γr,t and is determined by the regasification capacity constraint (equation
B.6). The respective profit function (equation B.14) is stated as:
max
irr,y
∏
r
(irr,y) =
∑
t∈T

γr,t · (capr,t +
∑
y∈Yt
irr,y)

−∑
y∈Y
(incr,y · irr,y). (B.14)
B.1.6. The LNG Problem
Because no specific players within the LNG market are modelled, one virtual in-
vestor is assumed to invest in LNG transport capacities (i.e. LNG tankers), who
is expected to behave perfectly competitive. Thereby, investments into additional
capacity conitinue until marginal investment costs equal marginal benefits. The op-
timisation problem of investments in LNG is defined in equation B.15, where the
congestion rent ιy is determined by the LNG capacity restriction (equation B.7).
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max
ilng y
∏
LNG
(ilng y)
=
∑
t∈T

ιt · 8760/12 · speed · (capt +
∑
y∈Yt
ilng y)

−∑
y∈Y
(incy · ilng y).
(B.15)
B.1.7. The Storage Operator’s Problem
Each storage facility, which is located in the respective demand region d, is operated
by one storage operator s ∈ S, who maximizes her revenue by buying gas in off-peak
periods at low prices and selling it during peak periods at high prices. Similar to
the producer’s problem each storage operator faces a dynamic optimisation problem
(equation B.16), maximising the injection and depletion of natural gas as well as
the annual investments (iss,y), subject to some capacity constraints (equations B.17
to B.19).
max
sis,t ,sds,t
iss,y
∏
s
(sis,t , sds,t , iss,y) =
∑
t∈T
βd,t(sds,t − sis,t)−
∑
y∈Y
(incs,y · iss,y) (B.16)
caps,t +
∑
y∈Yt
iss,y − sts,t ≥ 0 ∀s, t (εs,t) (B.17)
c f s · (caps,t +
∑
y∈Yt
iss,y − sis,t ≥ 0 ∀s, t (ρs,t) (B.18)
c f s · (caps,t +
∑
y∈Yt
iss,y − sis,t ≥ 0 ∀s, t (θs,t) (B.19)
The motion of the stock (sts,t) is defined as:
∆sts,t = sts,t+1 − sts,t = sis,t − sds,t ∀s, t (σs,t) (B.20)
B.1.8. Karush–Kuhn–Tucker(KKT) Conditions
The COLUMBUS model is based on profit optimization problems of the different
players (exporters, producers, transmission system operators, liquefiers, regasifiers).
Each profit optimization problem has corresponding first order conditions. Together
with the market clearing conditions, the first order conditions define the model.
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Exporters
−βd,t + (cve + 1) · sloped,t · t re,d,t −χe,d,t +λe,d,t ≥ 0
⊥ t re,d,t ≥ 0 ∀e, d, t.
(B.21)
−λe,n,n1,t +λe,n,t + t rcn,n1,t + t rcn,n1,t + opcn,t +φn,n1,t
+ ζl,t + γr,t + ιt · 2 · dist l,r ≥ 0 ⊥ f le,n,n1,t ≥ 0 ∀e, n, n1, t.
(B.22)
Producers
−λe,p,t + prcp,c,t +
∑
y∈Yt
αp,c,y +µp,c,t ≥ 0 ⊥ prp,c,t ≥ 0 ∀p, c, t (B.23)
αp,c,y+1 −αp,c,y ≤ 0 ⊥ drp,c,y ≥ 0 ∀p, c, y (B.24)
inc,p,y −
∑
t∈T (y)
µp,c,y ≥ 0 ⊥ ipp,c,y ≥ 0 ∀p, c, y (B.25)
Transmission System Operators
incn,n1,y −
∑
t∈Ty
φn,n1,t ≥ 0 ⊥ i tn,n1,y ≥ 0 ∀n, n1, y. (B.26)
Liquefiers
incl,y −
∑
t∈Ty
ζl,t ≥ 0 ⊥ ill,y ≥ 0 ∀l, y. (B.27)
Regasifiers
incr,y −
∑
t∈Ty
γr,t ≥ 0 ⊥ irr,y ≥ 0 ∀r, y. (B.28)
LNG Shippers
incy −
∑
t∈Ty
(ιt · 8760/12 · speed)≥ 0 ⊥ ilng y ≥ 0 ∀y. (B.29)
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Storage
−βd,t +σs,t + θs,t ≥ 0 ⊥ sds,t ≥ 0 ∀s, t (B.30)
−σs,t + βs,t +ρs,t ≥ 0 ⊥ sis,t ≥ 0 ∀s, t (B.31)
εs,t =∆σs,t = σs,t+1 −σs,t ≤ 0 ⊥ sts,t ≤ 0 ∀s, t (B.32)
inc,s −
∑
t∈Ty
[εs,t + c fs,t · (ρs, t + θs,t)]≥ 0 ⊥ iss,y ≥ 0 ∀s, y (B.33)
Market Clearing Conditions
The market clearing conditions are given by the following equations:∑
c∈C
prp,c,t − t re,d,t +
∑
n1∈(n1,n)∈A
f le,n1,n,t
− ∑
n1∈(n,n1)∈A
f le,n,n1,t = 0
⊥ λe,n,t f ree ∀e, n, t.
(B.34)
∑
e∈E
t re,d,t + mdoe,d,t + sds,t + sis,t − demd,t = 0 ⊥ βd,t free ∀d, t. (B.35)
Equation (B.34) must be fulfilled for each exporter e ∈ E that is active at the
node n ∈ Ne. Additionally, the equation ensures equality of traded volumes and
physical flows. Equation (B.35) defines the gas balance at demand nodes d in month
t making sure that the final demand is met.
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Demand Node Production Node Liquification Node Regasification Node Storage Node Country/Country Groups Continent
AE_Prod_umm AE_Prod_umm AE_Liq_das AE_Regas_dubai United Arab Emirates Middle East
AO_Prod_angoff AO_Prod_angoff AO_Liq_luanda Angola North Africa
AR_Prod_neuq AR_Prod_neuq AR_Regas_bahi AR_Prod_neuq Argentina Latin America
AT_Cons_oest AT_Cons_west Austria Europe
AU_Prod_nws AU_Prod_nws AU_Liq_burr AU_Prod_nws Australia Asia and Oceania
AZ_cons_azer AZ_Prod_others AZ_cons_azer Azerbaijan CIS
BALT_Cons_balt BALT_regas_balt BALT_Cons_balt Baltics Europe
BD_Cons_bangl Bangladesh Asia and Oceania
BE_Cons_belg BE_regas_zee BE_Cons_belg Belgium Euorpe
BG_Cons_bulg BG_Prod_others BG_Cons_bulg Bulgaria Europe
BH_Cons_bahr Bahrain Middle East
BN_Prod_bruoff BN_Prod_bruoff BN_Liq_lumut Brunei Asia and Oceania
BO_Prod_tarija BO_Prod_tarija Bolivia Latin America
BR_Cons_brazil BR_Regas_suape Brazil Latin America
BY_Cons_bela BY_Cons_bela Belarus CIS
CA_Prod_alber CA_Prod_alber CA_Liq_kiti CA_Regas_canap CA_Prod_alber Canada North America
CH_Cons_swi Switzerland Europe
CL_Cons_chile CL_Regas_santi Chile Latin America
CN_Cons_china CN_Cons_tarim CN_Regas_fuji CN_Cons_china China Asia and Oceania
CN_Prod_saich China Asia and Oceania
CO_Cons_columb Columbia Latin America
CY_Prod_cyp CY_Prod_others CY_Liq_cyp Cyprus Europe
CZ_Cons_czec CZ_Cons_czec Czechia Europe
DE_Cons_ger DE_Regas_wilh DE_Cons_ger Germany Europe
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DE_cons_nord Germany Europe
DE_cons_south Germany Europe
DK_Cons_denm DK_Prod_greenl DK_Liq_greenl DK_Cons_denm Denmark Europe
DK_Prod_tyra Denmark Europe
DO_Cons_dom DO_regas_andr Dominica Latin America
DZ_Prod_hassi DZ_Prod_hassi DZ_Liq_arzew Algeria Africa
EG_Prod_nildel EG_Prod_nildel EG_Liq_dami EG_Regas_egy Egypt Africa
ES_Cons_spa ES_Regas_barc ES_Cons_spa Spain Europe
FI_Cons_fin Finland Europe
FR_Cons_fr FR_Regas_fos FR_Cons_fr France Europe
GH_Cons_ghana Ghana Africa
GO_Cons_geo Georgia CIS
GQ_Prod_alba GQ_Prod_alba GQ_Liq_bioko Equatorial Guinea Africa
GR_Cons_grec GR_Regas_revi Greece Europe
HU_Cons_hun HU_Cons_hun Hungary Europe
ID_Prod_badak ID_Prod_badak ID_Liq_bonta Indonesia Asia and Oceania
IE_Cons_ire IE_Cons_ire Ireland Europe
IN_Cons_india IN_Cons_india IN_Regas_dahej India Asia and Oceania
IQ_Prod_alanf IQ_Prod_alanf Iraq Middle East
IR_Prod_sopa IR_Prod_sopa IR_Liq_assa Iran Middle East
IT_Cons_ita IT_Regas_spez IT_Cons_ita Italy Europe
JP_Cons_japan JP_Regas_higa JP_Cons_japan Japan Asia and Oceania
KR_Cons_korea KR_Regas_inch Korea Asia and Oceania
KW_Cons_kuw KW_Regas_kuw Kuwait Middle East
KZ_Prod_karach KZ_Prod_karach KZ_Prod_karach Kazakhstan CIS99
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LY_Prod_wafa LY_Prod_wafa LY_Liq_marsa Lybia Africa
MA_Cons_maroc Morocco Africa
MD_Cons_mol Moldavia Europe
MM_Prod_myaoff MM_Prod_myaoff Myanmar Asia and Oceania
MX_Cons_mex MX_Cons_mex MX_Regas_alta Mexico Latin America
MY_Prod_maloff MY_Prod_maloff MY_Liq_bintu MY_Regas_mal Malaysia Asia and Oceania
NE_Cons_neas NE_Prod_isra NE_Liq_isra Niger Middle East
NG_Prod_nigdel NG_Prod_nigdel NG_Liq_bonny Nigeria Africa
NL_Prod_gro NL_Prod_gro NL_Regas_rott NL_Prod_gro Netherlands Europe
NO_Cons_norw NO_Prod_nobar NO_Liq_snohv Norway Europe
NO_Prod_nosea Norway Europe
OM_Prod_saih OM_Prod_saih OM_Liq_qalhat Oman Middle East
PE_Prod_cam PE_Prod_cam PE_Liq_pacing Peru Latin America
PK_Cons_paki Pakistan Asia and Oceania
PL_Cons_pol PL_Cons_pol PL_Regas_swin PL_Cons_pol Poland Europe
PT_Cons_port PT_Regas_sin Portugal Europe
QA_Prod_nofi QA_Prod_nofi QA_Liq_ras Qatar Middle East
RO_Cons_rum RO_Prod_others RO_Cons_rum Romania Europe
RU_Prod_irku RU_Prod_irku RU_Prod_irku Russia CIS
RU_Prod_rusbar Russia CIS
RU_Prod_sahka RU_Liq_sahlng Russia CIS
RU_Prod_westsi Russia CIS
RU_Liq_murma Russia CIS
RU_Cons_komi RU_Cons_komi Russia CIS
RU_Cons_wour RU_Cons_wour Russia CIS
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SA_Prod_saudi SA_Prod_saudi Saudi Arabia Middle East
SE_Cons_swe SE_Cons_swe Sweden Europe
SG_Cons_singa SG_Regas_silng Singapore Asia and Oceania
SI_Cons_slow Slovenia Europe
SK_Cons_slova SK_Cons_slova Slovakia Europe
SY_Cons_syr SY_Prod_syr Syrian Arab Republic Middle East
TH_Cons_thai TH_Regas_thai Thailand Asia and Oceania
TM_Prod_amu TM_Prod_amu Turkmenistan CIS
TN_Cons_tunis Tunisia Africa
TR_Cons_tur TR_Liq_tur TR_Regas_marma TR_Cons_tur Turkey Europe
TT_Prod_dolph TT_Prod_dolph TT_Liq_atlng TT_Regas_atlng Trinidad and Tobago Latin Amercia
TW_Cons_taiw TW_Regas_yung Taiwan Asia and Oceania
UA_Cons_ukr UA_Prod_others UA_Cons_ukr Ukraine CIS
UK_Cons_gbr UK_Prod_gbns UK_Regas_milf UK_Cons_gbr Great Britain Europe
US_Cons_west US_Prod_alas US_Liq_kenai US_Regas_baja US_Cons_west United States of America North America
US_Cons_east US_Liq_gom US_Regas_cove US_Cons_east United States of America North America
US_Prod_henry US_Prod_henry US_Regas_lake US_Prod_henry United States of America North America
UZ_Prod_buhk UZ_Prod_buhk UZ_Prod_buhk Uzbekistan CIS
VE_Prod_paria VE_Prod_paria VE_Liq_sucre Venezuela Latin America
YE_Prod_marib YE_Prod_marib YE_Liq_balhaf Yemen Middle East
YUGO_Cons_yugo YUGO_Cons_yugo former Yugoslavia Europe
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C.1. Model description
Please see the model description in Appendix B.1.
C.2. Model Extensions
Equation (B.21) defines the first-order conditions of the exporter’s problem1. This
problem is re-formulated to optimize profits of exporters that sell volumes to a transit
country with the transit country’s conjectural variation cvt r and the slope of the final
demand region with the function slopedem,t
2:
−βd,t + (cve + 1) · (2+ cvt r) · slopedem,t · t re,d,t −χe,d,t +λe,d,t ≥ 0
⊥ t re,d,t ≥ 0 ∀e, d, t
(C.1)
Equation (C.1) has the structure of equation (4.8). The transit country can be
modeled as competitive (conjectural variation cvt r = −1) or as a Cournot player
(conjectural variation cvt r = 0). The exporters that are supplying to a final market
(including the transit country itself) have still first-order conditions of the form of
equation (B.21).
Furthermore, the market clearing conditions given by equations (B.34) and (B.35)
need to be extended. The volumes bought by the transit country t ransi t t need to
be included in those market clearing constraints for the nodes at the border of the
transit country where it buys the transit volumes n ∈ NTR:
1Growitsch et al. (2014) use a different convention of conjectural variations. This explains the dif-
ference between equation (11) in Growitsch et al. (2014) and equation (B.21).
2In the study at hand this is in particular the slope of the linear demand function of the EU market
which is modeled in two regions. A more detailed description of the regions is given in Section
4.4.2. It is based on each country’s linear demand function that are aggregated for the respective EU
regions. The parameters of the EU demand functions determine the demand function for Turkish
transit gas.
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∑
c∈C
prp,c,t + t ransi t t − t re,d,t +
∑
n1∈(n1,n)∈A
f le,n1,n,t
− ∑
n1∈(n,n1)∈A
f le,n,n1,t = 0
⊥ λe,n,t free ∀e, n ∈ NTR, t
(C.2)
The volumes bought by the transit country t ransi t t are included in the second
market clearing constraint as follows:
∑
e∈E
t re,d,t + sds,t − sis,t − t ransi t t = 0⊥ βd,t free ∀d, t (C.3)
C.3. Scenarios and Data sources
Table C.1.: Data and sources
Data
Reference demand Natural Gas Information 2017 (IEA, 2017b), Medium-Term
Gas Market Report 2015 (IEA, 2015b), World Energy Outlook
2015 (NPS) (IEA, 2015a)
Price elasticities Growitsch et al. (2014) and Egging et al. (2010)
Reference price Based on TTF 2014
Production costs Hecking et al. (2016), Seeliger (2006) and Aguilera et al.
(2009)
Existing pipeline infrastruc-
ture
Ten Year Network Development Plan (ENTSOG, 2015)
LNG facilities Capacity Map GIE (2015), LNG Industry Report GIIGNL
(2016)
Storage facilities Gas Storage Map GIE (2015), Natural Gas Information 2017
(IEA, 2017b)
Transportation costs ACER Market Report 2014 ACER (2015b), Interfax (2015)
and Pirani and Yafimava (2016)
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Table C.2.: Scenario Overview
Number Section Upstream
Sector
Turkish
Behavior
Further Scenario Characteristics
1.1 Section 4.5.1 oligopolistic competitive -
1.2 Section 4.5.1 oligopolistic oligopolistic -
2.1 Section 4.5.2 competitive competitive -
2.2 Section 4.5.2 competitive oligopolistic -
A.1 Appendix
C.4.2
oligopolistic oligopolistic transits from Azerbaijan and Turk-
menistan via Russia possible
A.2 Appendix
C.4.2
oligopolistic oligopolistic cartel of Russia, Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan
C.4. Sensitivity Analysis
C.4.1. Sensitivity on Turkish behavior in the oligopolistic setup
Figure C.1 illustrates how the Turkish transits (by origin) vary if the conjectural
variation of Turkey is varied between -1 and 0 in the oligopolistic gas market config-
uration. It becomes clear that Israel and Iran are very sensitive on Turkey’s transit
behavior. If Turkey decides to exert market power, transits of these countries via
Turkey to Europe are not competitive. Azerbaijan, however, is less sensitive because
it is only able to export gas via Turkey (cf. Section C.4.2 for a sensitivity in which
this assumption is relaxed).
Figure C.2 illustrates how the Turkish conjectural variation affects natural gas
prices in SEE and NWE. While the SEE price is below the NWE price with compet-
itive Turkish transits, this interrelation changes when market power is exerted: For
conjectural variations larger than -0.8, the SEE price is larger than the NWE price.
The market situations with Turkish conjectural variations between -1 and 0 illus-
trated in the Figures C.1 and C.2 are cases in which both the EU and Turkey would
benefit from the SGC, i.e. Turkey would earn some profits from transiting, and the EU
would enjoy lower gas prices compared to a situation with double marginalization.
Such a market situation could be e.g. the result of a bargaining process between gas
consumers and the transit country (similar to the bargaining between upstream pro-
ducers and the transit country mentioned in Section 4.2). However, it is important
to note that such a bargaining solution could become obsolete if a competitive up-
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Figure C.1.: Turkish gas transits into the EU per source in dependence on Turkish behavior
in 2030
stream market structure is assumed instead of an oligopolistic market because fewer
volumes would pass through the SGC in the competitive setup.
Figure C.2.: Natural gas price in SEE and NWE in dependence on Turkish behavior in 2030
C.4.2. Caspian Gas via Russia in the Oligopolistic Setup
In Section 4.5, it was assumed that Azerbaijan would be able to deliver gas via Turkey
only to reach the EU market. Besides the EU, Azerbaijan could solely sell its gas to
Georgia or Turkey. However, the Turkish and Georgian demand for Azerbaijani gas is
relatively small and accounted for only 8 bcm in 2015 (Pirani, 2016). Looking into
the past, Azerbaijan delivered up to 2 bcm of gas to Russia in 2012 (Pirani, 2016).
Since then supplies have declined to zero in 2015. As of 2016, Azerbaijan is even
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importing about 2 bcm/a from Russia.3 The main reason is the increasing domestic
demand and the underdeveloped production of the Shah Deniz field. This situation
may change when the Shah Deniz stage 2 will come online. Then, Azerbaijan would
be able again to export gas also to Russia or even via Russia into the EU.
The following sensitivities are implemented within an oligopolistic upstream mar-
ket structure. Therefore, the results from Section 4.5.1 are the relevant reference to
compare the sensitivities to. In a first sensitivity, it is assumed that Azerbaijan and
also Turkmenistan are able to deliver gas competitively via Russia into the EU while
Turkey is exerting transit market power. As a consequence, both countries would
not deliver any gas via Turkey and total Turkish transits to the EU would only be at
6.7 bcm in 2030. As shown in Figure C.3, these 6.7 bcm of natural gas that would
reach the EU are Iranian gas. Due to reduced competition in the first-stage oligopoly
(SGC producers competing about the transits through Turkey) compared to a situa-
tion in which Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are part of this oligopoly, the remaining
SGC producers can exercise more market power when selling gas to Turkey. Hence,
it becomes more profitable for Iran to export gas via Turkey to the EU. The EU,
however, benefits from Azerbaijani and Turkmen gas supplies via Russia. While EU
prices would be 1.5% (0.9%) lower in SEE (NWE) compared to the scenario "Turkish
market power" without outside options of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, EU’s con-
sumer surplus would be 0.1 billion EUR higher. As can be seen in Figure C.3, due
to lower natural gas transits, Turkey’s profit would be 0.5 billion EUR if Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan can circumvent Turkey instead of previously 1.8 billion EUR. But
because of lower European gas prices and stronger competition with Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan in its key markets, Russia would also lose 0.7 billion EUR revenues as
well as 0.2 billion EUR of profits by allowing transits on its territory compared to the
case in which Turkey exercises market power and no SGC producer can ship through
Russia. Thus, a situation in which Russia would allow Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan
to use its infrastructure to bring additional gas amounts into the EU seems to be
not likely. Therefore, this is not a viable solution for a more competitive European
upstream gas market.
Another possible scenario would be that Russia buys gas from Azerbaijan and Turk-
menistan and resells it to the EU instead of allowing competitive transits - similar
to Turkey’s assumed behavior. However, it is questionable if double marginalization
would be the appropriate approach to describe this setting, since Russia has a huge
indigenous gas production with comparably low production costs. Hence, Azerbai-
3http://www.azernews.az/oil_and_gas/96768.html
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jan and Turkmenistan are not in a good position to exert market power against the
Russian exporter.4 Therefore, the scenario in which Russia buys gas from Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan is modeled as a cartel situation in which the three countries offer
their gas amounts jointly as one player5. Together, these countries are in a strong
position to act strategically. Thus, compared to the scenario in which all SGC pro-
ducers have to sell gas to an oligopolistic Turkey in order to deliver gas to European
markets, gas prices are higher in both modeled EU market areas (SEE and NWE) by
about 2.8%. This leads to an EU welfare loss of 1.8 billion EUR compared to the
Turkish market power scenario with all SGC producers selling to Turkey. Nonethe-
less, as illustrated in Figure C.3, even if Russia and the Caspian producers Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan would form a cartel, still 5.7 bcm of mainly Iranian natural gas
would reach the EU markets via Turkey. Turkey could earn 0.4 billion EUR of profits.
Concluding, if Azerbaijan und Turkmenistan can ship gas through Russia (either
competitively or by cooperation forming a cartel with Russia), the volumes that
Turkey could resell to Europe would be below the already financed TAP capacity
of 10 bcm/a. Nevertheless, Turkey could still earn profits of 0.4-0.5 billion EUR
from the transits.6
4Turkey, on the other hand, does not have many options to buy gas from different producers.
5For modeling a cartel the same modeling approach as in Egging et al. (2009) is chosen.
6In reality, it is possible that the Caspian countries and Russia could find a form of cooperation be-
tween competitive transits and the cartel. In principle, a transit problem can also be seen as a
bargaining problem in which cooperation (cartel) and Cournot competition among the respective
producers would be extreme outcomes (cf. the discussion in Section 4.2 about options to avoid
double marginalization). However, both considered scenarios with respect to the relations be-
tween the Caspian countries and Russia have similar implications for the SGC, i.e. if Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan ship through Russia, the volumes coming through the SGC are diminished.
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Figure C.3.: Turkish gas transits into the EU per source and Turkish profits in dependence on
Caspian supply options in 2030
109

D. Supplementary Material for Chapter 5
D.1. Model description
Please see the model description in Appendix B.1.
D.2. COLUMBUS Model Extension
The supplier import constraint is extended by a maximum import limit f l_l imite,n,n1,t
:
− ∑
n1∈(n,n1)∈A
f le,n,n1,t + f l_l imite,n,n1,t ≥ 0 ⊥ τe,d,t ≥ 0 ∀e, d, t. (D.1)
Equation B.21 defines optimal import decision. It is supplemented by the comple-
mentary τe,d,t , of the equation D.1 that restricts the imports of the exporter e to a
maximum limit.
−βd,t + (cve + 1) · sloped,t · t re,d,t −χe,d,t +λe,d,t +τe,d,t ≥ 0
⊥ t re,d,t ≥ 0 ∀e, d, t.
(D.2)
D.3. Company shares of gas supplying countries
Table D.1 provides an overview of selected company shares that are applied to cal-
culate a member states market concentration.
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Table D.1.: Company structure of suppliers
Country Sup 1 Sup 2 Sup 3 Sup 4 Sup 5 Sup 6 others
AT 100%
DE 48% 23% 19% 7% 3%
DK 33% 28% 18% 11% 10%
HU 100%
IE 45% 37% 20%
IT 84% 9% 7%
NL 100%
PL 90% 10%
RO 52% 41% 4% 3%
NO 75% 13% 5% 3% 1% 1% 2%
AZ 100%
DZ 100%
LY 100%
RU 100%
D.4. Sensitivity: The Reference Scenario without Nord
Stream 2
In the Reference Scenario a demand for investment in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline of
55 bcm/a is identified by the COLUMBUS model. The pipeline is a direct connection
between the Russian Federation and Germany via the Baltic Sea, which will double
the capacity of the existing pipeline Nord Stream. The identified demand for invest-
ment is approximately the project’s technically available pipeline capacity. However,
the project is controversially discussed. The European Commission and the USA are
opponents of the project and argue that it would lead to a stronger European depen-
dence on Russian gas which would counteract the European diversification strategy.
The German government, by contrast, argues that the project is commercial.
In this sensitivity, the capacity of a direct connection between the Russian Fed-
eration and Germany is restricted to the existing pipeline Nord Stream and no in-
vestment in Nord Stream 2 is possible. The effects on the market concentration and
hence the HHI are limited. Only Sweden would additionally surpass the HHI thresh-
old of at most 2000, due to a change of the German and hence Danish import mix.
However, the German market concentration would be only slightly lower because
the absence of Nord Stream 2 would have an impact on the Germany re-exports
or transits but not on the country’s consumption. As a consequence thereof, the
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concentration of some of Germany’s neighbouring countries would be slightly lower
compared to the Reference Scenario with Nord Stream 2.
Figure D.1.: EU gas supply mix in the Reference Scenario without Nord Stream 2 in 2025
Figure D.1 depicts the EU supply mix in the considered scenario. It can be observed
that without Nord Stream 2 the share of Russian gas in the EU would be still high,
at 29 percent compared to 31 percent in the Reference Scenario. Hence, the lack
of Nord Stream 2 would mainly result in a relocation of that supply route to the
other Russian European pipeline routes, in particular the route via Ukraine. Thus,
this underpins the hypothesis that Nord Stream 2 will mainly be used to replace
the high cost Ukrainian Russian gas transits instead of bringing additional volumes
to the European market in the medium term1. However, the minor reduction in
Russian gas supply will be mainly intercepted by additional LNG imports. Hence, the
high transport costs via Ukraine can be interpreted as a competitive disadvantage of
Russian gas against LNG.
1In the long term it will be used to replace the more and more declining European gas production.
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